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Abstract  
We use equity crowdfunding data to ask how fundraising amounts can be explained by what 
entrepreneurs ask for, versus what investors want to invest. The analysis exploits unique features 
of crowdfunding where entrepreneurs not only set investment goals, but also chose when to close 
their campaigns. More experienced and more educated founder teams ask for more. Their 
campaigns succeed more often, and they raise more money. Female teams ask for less, are equally 
successful, yet raise significantly less. They also wait longer before closing campaigns, suggesting 
they want to raise more than what they originally asked for.  
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1. Introduction 
The so-called “FinTech revolution” is beginning to have a significant impact on the way new 
companies are financed. In the UK alone, it is estimated that at least 40% of early stage financing 
is now received via Equity Crowdfunding platforms, where the public (i.e., unaccredited investors, 
aka the crowd) invest in start-ups in return for equity. The UK is widely acknowledged as the most 
developed market, largely because the Financial Conduct Authority (the relevant regulator) 
adopted a laissez-faire approach in the early days of the industry. A 2017 report estimated over 300 
successful investment campaigns in 2017, making crowdfunding the second largest investor 
category in the UK (by number of companies), after venture capital, but ahead of corporate 
investors or angel networks (see Halmari, et al. (2017)). Equity crowdfunding platforms are 
increasingly favoured by angel investors who contribute a substantial fraction of investments 
(Estrin, Gozman and Khavul 2018; Wang, et al. 2019). Many regulators around the world are now 
following the FCA model, and equity crowdfunding is growing fast in much of the developed 
world. 
This is good news not only for start-ups, but also for finance researchers. These electronic 
platforms provide a window on the process of how entrepreneurs raise money from investors, 
revealing details that are difficult to observe in more traditional offline settings. In particular we 
can observe the fundraising strategies pursued by entrepreneurs, and how the investors react. This 
allows us to address some long-standing fundamental questions about the entrepreneurial 
fundraising process. 
Our central research question is what determines fundraising campaign outcomes? We are not just 
interested in whether campaigns succeed or not, but how much money entrepreneurs actually raise 
for their ventures. A central theme is to distinguish whether certain entrepreneurs ask for or want 
to raise less money, a choice made by the entrepreneur, versus receive less money, a choice made 
collectively by the investors. The unique strength of our data is that in addition to the usual 
information about the amounts actually raised, we also observe specific choices made by the 
entrepreneur. First, at the beginning of the campaign, the entrepreneur sets a campaign goal. This 
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is the amount of funding s/he asks for, arguably a signal of what s/he wants. S/he also specifies 
how much equity is issued in return. Second, at the end of a successful campaign that has met its 
campaign goal, the entrepreneur decides when to close the campaign. This decision reveals further 
information about the amount of money the entrepreneur truly wants, beyond what s/he asked for 
at the start. This is a novel measure in the literature that introduces the important distinction 
between what the entrepreneur asks for, versus what s/he actually needs or wants.  
In order to analyse entrepreneurial fundraising strategies, we look for meaningful variation across 
start-ups. A prior literature, including the influential work of Bernstein et al. (2017), suggests that 
the most important characteristics of early stage ventures revolve around founder teams. We focus 
on three important dimensions of founders: their prior entrepreneurial experience (Colombo and 
Grilli 2005; Hsu 2007; Gimmon and Levie 2010; Gompers, et al. 2010) their prior business 
education (Colombo and Grilli 2005; Gimmon and Levie 2010; Kaplan and Stromberg 2004; 
Mollick 2014), and their gender (Ewens and Townsend 2019; Bapna and Ganco 2018; Marom, 
Robb and Sade 2016). 
In the UK the two leading equity crowdfunding platforms are CrowdCube and SEEDRS. They are 
similar in size and jointly account for over 80% of the market. We obtained the proprietary data 
from SEEDRS. Our dataset encompasses all campaigns on SEEDRS for the period July 2012 
(when SEEDRS started) to June 2017. To obtain further information on founder characteristics we 
augment the data with information available online on Linked-In. We have complete information 
on 767 campaigns, of which 333 (43%) were successful. These campaigns involve 576 distinct 
companies and comprise 18,955 investors making a total of 45,952 pledges. Among the successful 
campaigns, the average goal is £189K, and the average amount eventually raised is £291K. Across 
all campaigns, 26% of all founder teams have at least one founder with prior entrepreneurial 
experience, and 13% with prior business education. Moreover, 9% of all campaigns only have 
female founders, and another 16% have founder teams of mixed gender.  
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step we examine the relationships 
between founder characteristics and the choice of campaign parameters. In particular we look at 
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how different start-ups choose different campaign goals and different valuations (i.e., how much 
equity they are giving up). Our regressions control for numerous other company characteristics 
and timing. The second step looks at campaign success, which means that within 60 days the 
company receives enough investment pledges to meet its campaign goal. If the goal is not met, the 
campaign fails and none of the pledges are converted into investment. However, if the goal is met, 
the company is allowed to keep the campaign going.  
The third step of our analysis looks at the final amount of money raised, thus answering our main 
research question about the determinants of fundraising amounts. Our analysis distinguishes 
between direct versus total effects. A company characteristic, such as experience of the founders, 
can have a direct effect on campaign success, as well as an indirect effect through the campaign 
choices, namely the goal and the valuation. The total effect is then the sum of the direct and indirect 
effect (Hayes 2014). We also examine daily funding flows as a measure of investor interest, and 
its relationship with founder characteristics. 
The final fourth step further exploits the richness of our data, leveraging the dynamics in the daily 
investment data. Of particular interest to us is the entrepreneur’s decision when to stop the 
campaign. This reveals information about how much money the entrepreneur actually wants, over 
and beyond what they asked for at the beginning when formulating their investment goal. 
Specifically, we estimate a dynamic panel model with two equations. The first equation measures 
investor demand, as a function of company characteristics and other intervening events. The 
second equation estimates the entrepreneur’s decisions to close their campaign. This optimal 
stopping decision takes into account the endogenous investment flows which are estimated in the 
first equation. 
Our main findings across the four steps are as follows. Teams with more entrepreneurial experience 
ask for more money upfront, have a higher probability of success, end up raising more money. 
Interestingly, the additional funding amount is fully reflected in the higher campaign goals, so once 
we control for goals, there is no more significant experience effect. This suggests that experienced 
entrepreneurs fully take their strengths into account when setting their investment goals. As far as 
5 
 
business education, we measure it by whether founders have an MBA, although the results are 
very similar using other measures of business education. We find that teams with more business 
education ask for more money and higher valuations. Their success probability is the same, but the 
total amount of funding raised is significantly higher. Again, we find that this higher amount is 
fully reflected in their higher initial fundraising goals.  
Concerning gender effects, the fraction of females in the team is associated with lower fundraising 
goals and lower valuations. This effect is driven by both female-only and mixed gender teams. We 
find that gender does not have a significant effect on campaign success. However, the amounts of 
money eventually raised are significantly lower for female teams. Even after we account for their 
lower investment goals and lower valuations, all-female and mixed gender teams still raise less 
money.  
In a panel model based on daily investment flows, we jointly estimate investors’ investment and 
entrepreneurs’ stopping decisions, to further explain this last finding. We find that all-female start-
ups attract lower daily investment flows, both before and after reaching their targets. Importantly, 
we find that female teams hold out for longer, i.e., they prolong their campaigns to raise additional 
money. While the evidence for this last finding is statistically not very strong, it hints at the 
possibility that even though female founders ask for less, they actually do want more funding. 
Overall, we note that it matters what entrepreneurs ask for, since the final amount of money raised 
is largely determined by their initial ask. Hence the title of the paper: “Be careful what you ask for, 
as you may get it.” 
While we believe that our joint analysis of founder characteristics, campaign choices, investor 
behaviour, and campaign outcomes breaks new ground, and sheds new light on the question of 
what determines fundraising amounts, we also recognize some limitations of our analysis. First, 
we can control for selection effects within the population of companies that start campaigns on 
SEEDRS, but we are unable to control for the self-selection of companies into SEEDRS in the first 
place. This does not bias our results, because our model estimates well-defined effects within a 
well-defined population. However, it leaves open an interesting research question about what kind 
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of entrepreneurs seek equity crowdfunding in the first place, such as the work by Ahlers, et al. 
(2015) and Loher (2017). Second, our data does not allow us to observe the gender of investors. A 
recent literature suggests that investors tend to invest in entrepreneurs of the same gender. This is 
consistent with the lower investment flows identified in our data. The novelty of our contribution 
is to show how female teams respond to lower investor demand, both in terms of setting lower 
goals at the beginning of campaigns and delaying the final stopping decisions at the end of 
campaigns. Third, our analysis of gender effects looks at the impact of gender but cannot uncover 
the origins of why female entrepreneurs behave differently, or why investors seems to treat female 
teams differently. This last question is clearly a much larger challenge for the entire literature on 
gender and finance. 
The literature on crowdfunding is growing fast. Most of that literature focuses on rewards-based 
crowdfunding platforms (Mollick 2014; Mollick and Nanda 2016; Xu 2017), or lending platforms 
(Havrylchyk and Verdier 2018; Mohammadi and Shafi 2016). However, we would expect equity 
crowdfunding to be somewhat different. Compared to rewards-based platforms, the investment 
amounts are significantly larger. An average campaign on Kickstarter, a leading rewards-based 
platform, raises $23K, compared to about £292K on SEEDRS. Compared to lending platforms, 
the risks are much higher given that equity crowdfunding platforms target start-ups whereas 
lending platforms target established businesses.  
The literature about equity crowdfunding focuses mostly on investor behaviour. One central 
question is the wisdom of the crowd: is there herd behaviour, and is that behaviour rational? Estrin 
and Khavul (2015) examine this question with UK data from CrowdCube, whereas Åstebro et al. 
(2017) approach this question using SEEDRS data. This paper changes the perspective by focusing 
on the strategies of the entrepreneurs, asking how their choices affect campaign outcomes. This 
paper takes a deeper look into the question of how much money entrepreneurs actually raise, and 
what founder characteristics and choices affect these outcomes. 
Our paper also contributes to the broader literature on gender and finance. Experimental evidence 
suggests that women are in general more risk-averse than men (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Croson 
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and Gneezy 2009). However, this may not be the case once we consider self-selection into the 
occupation in business and finance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Ragunathan, 2017; 
Atkinson et al., 2003; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). In entrepreneurial finance, Verheul and Thurik 
(2001), Coleman and Robb (2009), and Robb and Coleman (2010) find that female entrepreneurs 
raise a smaller amount of start-up capital. These factors may explain why female-owned businesses 
are less successful than male-owned businesses (Fairlie and Robb 2009). Perhaps closer still to our 
study, Marom, Robb and Sade (2016) show that on Kickstarter men seek significantly higher levels 
of capital than women for their projects and raise more funds than women. Moreover, Bapna and 
Ganco (2018) report the results from a randomized field experiment on a US equity crowdfunding 
platform. Their main finding is that female investors are significantly less interested in male 
founder teams, although there are no significant effects for male investors in their study. In a related 
vein, Ewens and Townsend (2019) consider data from AngelList. They find that male investors are 
less interested in female-led ventures, even though the male-led ventures they prefer end up 
performing worse. Note that these issues are naturally also hotly debated in the business press.  
Marianne Hudson (2017) argues that “women investors support women entrepreneurs”, and 
Steafel (2018) reports that “women don't ask for the money they need” according to angel investor 
Jenny Tooth.1 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical 
foundations. Section 3 describes the data, explains the variables, and provides descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 contains the main empirical analysis. Section 5 looks at the robustness and extensions. 
It is followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
1 In a somewhat related vein, Gompers and Wang (2017) find that most venture capital firms are 
male-dominated, although the hiring of female partners increases when male partners have 
daughters instead of boys as their own children. Finally, Howell and Nanda (2019) find that male 
entrepreneurs have a higher propensity to network with potential investors. 
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2. Theoretical Foundations 
Central to our analysis is the entrepreneur’s decision to set the fundraising goal, which has to be 
met for the campaign to succeed. In this section we provide some theoretical foundations on how 
to think about this choice. 
 
It is useful to start with a puzzle. Why doesn’t the entrepreneur ask for £1 only? Clearly s/he could 
always achieve that goal and then let the campaign run for as long as s/he wanted to. The problem 
is that investors will infer information from the entrepreneur’s choice of fundraising goal. A goal 
of £1 would probably be viewed as a joke. More generally, a low goal is likely to be interpreted as 
a signal that the entrepreneur doesn’t want or need a lot of money. Consequently, it is likely that 
investors will respond accordingly and limit their investment pledges. This in turn implies that the 
entrepreneur has to be strategic in terms of setting an appropriate goal. The basic trade-off is that 
setting a higher goal signals to the market a desire to raise more money. At the same time, it is 
riskier, since it increases the probability of not hitting the goal. 
 
To provide some theoretical clarity on how entrepreneurs strategically chose their fundraising 
goals, we introduce a highly stylized and minimalistic model. The purpose of the model is not to 
provide a realistic description of the more complex decision processes at work in reality, but to 
illustrate how optimal choices are likely to be influenced by simple model parameters about 
founder abilities and preferences. The Online Appendix contains all of the formal derivations, here 
we limit ourselves to a brief description. 
 
In our model the crowd observes various start-up characteristics, including founder team 
experience, education and gender. The aggregate amount of funding available is denoted by 𝜙. 
The entrepreneur doesn’t know this parameter, his/her guess is characterized by a normal 
distribution with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎. Based on that, the entrepreneur choses a campaign goal 
 𝛾. If 𝜙 < 𝛾, the campaign fails, and no investment takes place. If 𝜙 > 𝛾, the campaign succeeds. 
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To model the signalling role of 𝛾, we assume that maximum funding provided by investors is 𝜆𝛾, 
where 𝜆>1 is some fixed parameter. This simply says that crowd investors take the fundraising 
goal 𝛾 into account and limit the maximum investment amounts accordingly. This assumption is 
not meant to be a realistic description of investment behaviour, instead it is meant to capture the 
simple notion that investors interpret fundraising goals as a signal of the company’s funding need.  
 
This simple model generates an easily tractable analytical solution of optimal fundraising goals. 
In the Online Appendix we derive three main results.  
1. Entrepreneurs ask for less than what they expect is available on average, i.e., 𝛾 < 𝜇. After 
they reached their goal, they take more funding (up to 𝜙).  
2. Entrepreneurs with better signals (lower σ) ask for more (𝛾 higher), i.e., an amount closer 
to their expected amount (𝛾 closer to 𝜇). 
3. Entrepreneurs who are more risk-averse ask for less funding (𝛾 lower). 
 
The first result provides a simple characterization of optimal fundraising goals. Entrepreneurs are 
strategic and trade off the signalling benefit of a higher goal against the higher risk of campaign 
failure. The optimal choice (𝛾) is always below the expected available amount (μ).  
 
The second result suggests that entrepreneurs who have a better estimate of the expected value 
(lower 𝜎) set higher goals (higher 𝛾). This is because they are more confident in their ability to 
read the market, and thus set a reachable goal. In our empirical analysis we can think of 
entrepreneurial experience and business education as proxies for the ability to better predict 
investor demand (i.e., lower 𝜎). 
 
The third result suggests that risk aversion affects the optimal goal choice. There is a large prior 
literature that suggests that females are more risk averse than males. There are many nuances and 
controversies around this (see Kaplan and Walley 2016). Relevant to us, it is not clear that this 
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result also applies to the entrepreneurs that self-selected to seek funding on SEEDRS. 
Notwithstanding this, the model predicts that if female entrepreneurs are more risk-averse, then 
they would ask for less funding at the start. For a given investor demand 𝜙, this also implies that 
they would continue accepting more funding at the end of the campaign.  
3. Data 
3.1. Data Sources 
We use three main data sources: (i) proprietary data from SEEDRS, a UK based equity 
crowdfunding platform; (ii) publicly available LinkedIn profiles of entrepreneurs; and (iii) other 
publicly available data. 
SEEDRS provided us with the data for the period 2012-2017, which covers 1,125 campaigns, with 
135,053 investments made by 39,555 investors. We exclude 55 fund campaigns and convertible 
campaigns, 25 campaigns that were still ongoing in June 2017 and 1 campaign that was missing 
valuation data. The first equity crowdfunding campaign in our sample received its first investment 
on July 4th, 2012 and the last campaign closed on June 3rd, 2017. 
The SEEDRS data includes identifying information about the founders (entrepreneurs) that were 
running these crowdfunding campaigns. This includes company name, names of entrepreneurs, 
their titles and roles in the start-up, and their equity shares. We use this information to manually 
identify the founders (entrepreneurs). We define a founder as an individual with a management 
role and an equity stake that exceeds 5%. We do not count non-executive directors, entrepreneurs 
with advisory roles, or entrepreneurs with a small equity stake as part of the founding team. Since 
most of these are British companies, we manually check this by looking up their Companies House 
UK incorporation records and first annual return, where available.  
For each founder of a company that ran a SEEDRS equity crowdfunding campaign, we hand-
collected information about their educational and professional background from their publicly 
available LinkedIn profiles. We also used the information about the team that was included on the 
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SEEDRS campaign page. As such, we gathered data on entrepreneurs’ education and professional 
experience, as well as gender. The professional experiences include both the current company of 
the SEEDRS crowdfunding campaign, as well as other employment, prior, concurrent, and 
possibly after the campaign. We gathered and coded this data for 1,425 entrepreneurs from 792 
companies; for 35 companies, none of the founders had LinkedIn or any information on their 
SEEDRS profile. Our 1,425 entrepreneurs ran 1,007 SEEDRS campaigns.  
From SEEDRS we obtain data on campaign goals, valuation, equity offered, and all investment 
pledges associated with the campaign. It should be noted that relative to traditional databases of 
entrepreneurial finance (such as Thomson One for venture capital deals), the quality of the 
SEEDRS data is clearly superior. Valuation data, for example, is notoriously hard to obtain in these 
traditional databases. Moreover, our pledge-level investment data is very granular, allowing us to 
look at daily dynamics of investment flows into each campaign. 
We structure our data into four samples. The first is the sample of all crowdfunding campaigns 
where the analysis is cross-sectional in nature. The second is the sample of all successful 
crowdfunding campaigns, which is again cross-sectional in nature. A campaign is successful when 
it raises enough money to satisfy the campaign goal. SEEDRS average campaign success rate is 
approximately 35%. The third sample is a panel of daily events about their campaign, including 
investment flows. Specifically, the third sample considers the panel of all campaigns from the day 
of first investment, until either reaching goal (for successful campaigns) or the day of last 
investment (for unsuccessful campaigns). The fourth sample focuses only on successful campaigns 
and adds campaign stopping decisions, made by entrepreneur, in response to observed daily 
investment flows. This fourth sample is a panel that follows successful campaigns from the first 
day that they can stop (which is one week after reaching the goal), until the day the campaign is 
ended. 
We use a balanced data sample where none of the dependent or explanatory variables relevant for 
our analysis are missing. For the cross-sectional data our balanced sample of 767 campaigns 
includes 333 successful campaigns and 434 unsuccessful campaigns. The panel data for the third 
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sample consist of 45,952 observations for the 767 campaigns. Successful campaigns take an 
average of 31 days to reach their goal, and a further 30 days to close. For the fourth sample, we 
have 7,814 observations in the balanced data from 321 successful campaigns that stopped on or 
after the 7th day of reaching their campaign goals.2 
3.2. Variable Definitions 
Throughout the paper we use the subscript 𝑖 to denote cross-sectional variation (i.e., across 
campaigns), and the subscript 𝑡 to denoted time variation in panel date (i.e., varying daily). For 
our empirical analysis it is useful to introduce variable categories. For the cross-sectional analysis 
of campaigns, we use the following variable categories: 
 
• We denote by 𝑮𝒊 the fundraising strategy variables, namely funding goal and equity 
offered. 
• We denote by 𝑺𝒊 the campaign success dummy.  
• We denote by 𝑭𝒊 the funding amount variable. 
• We denote by 𝑿𝒊 the founder characteristics variables, namely entrepreneurial 
experience, business education, and gender. 
• We denote by 𝒁𝒊 the control variables, namely founder team size, prior SEEDRS 
campaigns, tax breaks, sector dummies, and quarter fixed effects. 
• We denote by 𝑴𝒊 the momentum variables, which are proxies for investor demand. They 
are measured during the first week of the campaign and include number (#) and strengths 
($) of competing campaigns, tax credit deadlines, Google search trends, rain, and 
temperatures. 
 
For the daily panels we further use the following variable categories: 
 
2 For 15 campaigns, it appears that they stopped during the cooling off period, so these are excluded from this 
analysis. 
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• We denote by 𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒑𝒊,𝒕 the campaign stopping variable, measured daily. 
• We denote by 𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒊,𝒕 the daily investment flow variable, measured daily. 
• We denote by 𝑴𝒊,𝒕 the momentum variables, namely number (#) and strengths (£) of 
competing campaigns, tax credit deadlines, Google search trends, rain, and temperatures, 
all measured daily. 
• We denote by 𝑷𝒊,𝒕 the panel variables, namely the time trend, day-of-week and holidays, 
measured daily, and cooling off investment amounts, measured during the mandatory 
cooling off period (the first week after reaching the goal). 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of all the variables used in the analysis. We now discuss them in 
greater detail. For this, it useful to briefly explain the campaign process. Prior to the launch of the 
campaign the company defines its fundraising strategy (𝐺𝑖). It sets the all-important fundraising 
goal which is the minimum amount of money that needs to be raised for the campaign to succeed. 
Whether a campaign reaches its goal or not is the basis for the campaign success variable (𝑆𝑖). 
Specifically, if after 60 days the campaign has not received enough investment pledges to cover 
the fundraising goal, the campaign fails and no investment takes place. However, if the goal is 
reached within this time frame, then the campaign continues. There is a mandatory cooling off 
period that lasts 7 days. After 7 days the founders are allowed to close the campaign. In other 
words, founders can stop the campaign as early as the 8th day after reaching the goal, or they can 
wait for longer. Each company choses its own final stopping date (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡). 
Another component of the fundraising strategy (𝐺𝑖) is what investors receive in return for the funds 
invested. This can be expressed equivalently as the amount of equity offered (at the fundraising 
goal), or the company pre-money valuation. Those two measures are mechanically related.3 We 
 
3 The key mechanical relationship is given by Equity Offered * Goal = Post-money valuation = Pre-money 
Valuation + Goal. This can be solved for Equity Offered = Goal / (Goal + Pre-money Valuation), and it can also be 
solved for Pre-money Valuation = Goal*( (1 - Equity Offered) / Equity Offered). 
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provide some descriptive statics on both measures and Table 4 contains regression for both. In the 
subsequent analysis, however, we can only use one of them as dependent variables.4  
Next let us explain how investment pledges work on the SEEDRS platform, and how we use the 
pledge-level investment data to calculate the amounts of funds raised every day by each campaign. 
Most investors show an interest by registering a pledge, and then pay the money if the campaign 
is successful. However, investors are also allowed to either cancel the investment (at any time) or 
to leave the investment unpaid once the campaign is successful. Thus, a small number of investors 
cancel pledges or don't pay them. We exclude such pledges that were cancelled or left unpaid, so 
as to focus on realized investment amounts. An analysis of strategic investor behaviour is outside 
the scope of this paper, but the work by Åstebro et al. (2017) uses the same dataset to examine 
exactly that.  
After founders close their campaigns, they can also reject some of the funding. In the data, this is 
common but the amounts the entrepreneurs reject are very small. We exclude the rejected pledges 
from the analysis. Lastly, we also exclude pledges that were rejected by SEEDRS due to concerns 
about money fraud, or due to investors' input errors. Summing up, we use the universe of non-
cancelled and non-rejected investment pledges to calculate daily investment flows into each 
campaign (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡) and the total funding amount (𝐹𝑖). 
For the founder characteristics variables (𝑋𝑖), we aggregate founder-level variables into campaign-
level data. We focus on team averages and dummy variables that measure the presence of 
entrepreneurial experience, business education, and gender. For gender we distinguish three 
categories of companies: all-male, all-female, and mixed gender. We also calculate the share of 
founders that are female. We similarly calculate our main measures of entrepreneurial experience 
and business education. Specifically, we calculate shares and dummies for whether any founders 
 
4 Note that entrepreneurs are advised to set funding goal and company valuation to be realistic and comparable to 
other similar companies. This is the advice from CrowdCube (2018) and similar advice is given by SEEDRS. We 
think of entrepreneurs setting the goal and equity offered as the result of an optimization problem that is a function 
of how much funding they need and what they think they can get, subject to the signalling considerations discussed 
in Section 2. 
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have experience founding a ‘proper’ company. By ‘proper’ we define any company that has some 
signs of success: either as an IPO, acquisition, private investment, or (self-reported) business 
growth. This definition helps us to weed out founders of trivial companies (e.g., personal 
consulting) or tax shelters. For business education we look at whether founders have an MBA. 
Section 5 reports several robustness checks about our measurement of experience and education.  
For the control variables (𝑍𝑖), we include the size of the founder team. Since companies can come 
back to SEEDRS to run additional campaigns, we control for whether the company had a prior 
SEEDRS campaign. In the UK, there are tax breaks for investors that differ by the type of company. 
We distinguish between campaigns where the company has eligibility under the SEIS programme 
(this programme is for the first money into very young companies and offers up to 50% tax credits), 
or under the EIS programme (this is for slightly older companies and offers up to 30% tax credits), 
or no eligibility.5 Since eligibility is partly related to age, our dummies indirectly proxy for 
company age (which is not otherwise recoded in the data). From SEEDRS we also obtain the 
following sector controls: Clothing and Home, E-Commerce and Marketing, Food and Drink, 
Games and Entertainment, Finance, Transport and Travel, and Technology. We also use calendar 
fixed effects from Q3 of 2012 to Q2 of 2017. 
We also include momentum variables (𝑀𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖,𝑡) as measures of external investor demand, both 
at the daily level (used in panel analysis), and as an average during the first week of campaign 
(used in cross-sectional analysis). The first category of momentum variables relates to competition 
on the SEEDRS platform, which we measure with the number (#) and fundraising strength ($) of 
competing campaigns. The second category relates to investor behaviour at the end of the tax year 
that is potentially induced by tax breaks for investors described earlier. We interact tax credit 
incentives with the applicable deadline for determining the investment portfolio and filing UK 
 
5 To be more specific, investors in the UK can receive initial tax relief of 50% on investments up to £100,000. 
Additionally, investors in SEIS eligible companies receive a 50% Capital Gains Tax (CGT) exemption on gains 
which are invested in SEIS shares. To qualify for SEIS, the company must be new, broadly speaking: less than two 
years old, have fewer than 25 employees, and gross assets of less than £200,000. For older companies, and for a 
larger investment level, there is EIS: investors can invest up to £1,000,000 in unlisted qualifying later-stage 
qualifying companies in any tax year, and receive 30% tax relief. 
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income taxes, which is typically in the first week of April each year. We also consider the number 
of searches for “equity crowdfunding” on Google in the UK as a measure of popularity for this 
alternative asset class in general, partially due to media coverage. Note that we are not considering 
searches specific to the SEEDRS platform because we do not want to capture individuals who 
search for the key word “SEEDRS” just to get to the SEEDRS site. As a last category of the 
momentum variables we consider the weather—the amount of rainfall and the temperature in 
London, which is the most frequent location of investors and founders on the platform. 
We also include additional controls, denoted by 𝑃𝑖,𝑡, that are specific to panel analysis. Most of 
these variables are daily and related to time—the time trend, fixed effects for the day-of-week as 
well as for long weekend or a week of public holidays. For the fourth sample, which starts after 
the cooling off period (the first week after reaching the goal), we also include the amount of funds 
raised during this mandatory cooling off period as an additional control in the panel setting. 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our balanced sample. Panel A focused on the cross-section 
of campaigns, Panel B on the panel data. Panel C reports some of the most important pairwise 
correlations for the cross-sectional sample. We note from Panel A of Table 2 that the fraction of 
founders with prior entrepreneurial experience is 18%, and that 26% of all teams have at least one 
founder with such experience in the balanced sample. Similarly, 9% of founders have prior 
business education, and 13% of all teams have at least one founder with business education in the 
balanced sample. In terms of gender mix, we find that 16% of founders are female. 9% of all teams 
are all-female, and another 16% have mixed gender team in the balanced sample. By means of 
comparison, a report by Atomico (2017) finds that 5% of start-up founders are all-female. This 
suggests that SEEDRS attracts slightly more female founders than the general population. 
Figure 1 illustrates the heterogeneity in fundraising strategies and outcomes by experience, 
education, and gender, in the balanced sample.  
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Figure 1, Panel A: Fundraising strategies 
 
 
Figure 1, Panel B: Fundraising outcomes 
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Panel A in Figure 1 shows that the average campaign goal is £189K, the average pre-money 
valuation is £2.58M, with 10% equity offered at goal. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the average 
campaign success rate is 43%.6 Successful teams raise £292K. 
Experienced teams set higher goals and company valuations relative to inexperienced teams, but 
they offer a very similar share of equity. Specifically, a team that has at least one experienced 
founder has an average goal of £248K and an average valuation of £3.9M. A team of inexperienced 
founders asks for £79K less in terms of fundraising goal and has on average a valuation that is 
£1.9M less. For business education, where the few teams with MBAs set an £100K higher goal 
and value themselves approximately £3M more, on average, relative to numerous teams without 
any founds that have an MBA. In terms of gender, we note that female teams set lower fundraising 
goals: all-female teams ask for £80K less than all-male teams, mixed-gender teams ask for £58K 
less. They also set lower valuations than all-male teams. All-female start-ups value themselves 
approximately £1.3M less, and mixed gender ones £1M less. 
These descriptive statistics already suggest that experienced teams pursue more aggressive 
fundraising strategies, whereas female teams pursue safer fundraising strategies. Some of this 
variation could naturally be because these teams are running equity crowdfunding campaigns in 
different sectors, or because all-male teams might have different levels of experience or education, 
etc. We explore this more deeply in our formal regression analysis. 
There are no substantial differences in the likelihood of success by gender and education, although 
there are some differences by experience. Experienced teams reach the goal 51% of the time on 
average, as compared to 40% for inexperienced teams. Experienced teams also raise more money: 
a team that has at least one experienced founder raises £79K more than a team with inexperienced 
founders. This comparison is in a sample of successful campaigns, since campaigns that do not 
 
6 This is marginally higher than the platform-wide campaign success rate of 35% due to the fact that entrepreneurs 
that ran unsuccessful campaigns had less information listed on their LinkedIn profiles and were more likely to be 
excluded from the balanced data sample. Unsuccessful campaigns are also associated with unknown sector 
(industry) of the company more frequently, which also led to exclusion.  
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reach their goal target and that are therefore unsuccessful do not raise any money at all. Teams 
with at least one MBA founder have similar success rates as teams without MBA founders, but the 
successful ones raise £250K more on average. 
While female teams have similar prospects for campaign success, they raise considerably less 
money. All-female teams raise £116K on average, which is a little over a third of the money raised 
by all-male teams. Mixed gender teams raise £183K on average, which is a little over half of the 
money raised by all-male teams. These striking differences raise important questions that our 
formal regression analysis aims to address. In particular, the descriptive evidence that all-female 
teams pursue safer fundraising strategies and raise less money, does not yet tell us whether all-
female teams want less money, or whether it is the investors who want to give them less. 
Figure 1, Panel C finally looks at daily investment data of successful campaigns, around the time 
of reaching the target goal. While there are no notable differences due to experience or education, 
we note lower investment flows to teams composed of female founders only, especially after 
reaching the goal. Our panel analysis will take a deeper look at these investment dynamics.   
Figure 1, Panel C: Daily Investment Flows 
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4. Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis is comprised of four parts. First, we examine how founder team 
characteristics relate to fundraising strategies. Second, we examine how founder team 
characteristics and fundraising strategies affect the likelihood of campaign success. Third, we 
examine the determinants of fundraising outcomes. Fourth, we analyse the choice to stop 
campaigns, which also requires modelling daily investment flows. 
4.1. Fundraising Strategies 
We start off by modelling the relationship between founder team characteristics 𝑋𝑖 and fundraising 
strategies 𝐺𝑖. The empirical regression is given by 
𝐺𝑖 = 𝑓𝐺(𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝐺,𝑖     (1) 
Recall that the subscript 𝑖 indicates that variation is cross-sectional across campaigns. The standard 
errors 𝜀𝐺,𝑖 are clustered at the company level, to account for repeat campaigns of the same 
company. We estimate the model using OLS regressions. Table 3 reports the results for three 
fundraising strategies: funding goal, the valuation, and the equity offered.7  
We use two types of measures for founder team characteristics 𝑋𝑖: continuous shares and dummies. 
The continuous model regresses the fundraising strategy variables 𝐺𝑖 on the share of founders that 
are experienced, that have business education, and that are female. The dummy model regresses 
𝐺𝑖 on dummy variables indicating whether the team has at least one experienced founder, at least 
one founder with business education, whether the team is female-only, and whether the team is 
mixed-gender.  
Table 3 finds that experienced teams have significantly higher campaign goals. The coefficients 
are economically large. In the dummy specification of column 2, for example, having a founder 
 
7 Given the simultaneity of choice, we also re-estimated Table 3 using SUR models with any two of the three 
equations. We found that the results were always very similar. We thus conclude that the correlation of residuals in 
these regression models is not a concern. 
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with prior entrepreneurial experience increases the funding goal by 22%.8 The effects of 
experience on valuation and equity offered, however, are not statistically significant. Teams with 
prior business education also have higher funding goals, the effect is statistically significant, and 
the magnitude of the effect is large. Column 2, for example, suggests having a founder with an 
MBA increases the funding goal by 36%. Teams with prior business experience also ask for higher 
valuations. The presence of an MBA increases valuations by 50%. When it comes to the equity 
offered, the effects of higher valuations and larger funding goals wash out each other, and the 
coefficient is insignificant.   
Table 3 shows that teams that have a higher proportion of female founders ask for significantly 
less money and set significantly lower valuations. These effects wash out each other for the equity 
offered. The lower funding goals and lower valuation are important finding by themselves, 
especially since our regressions already control for founder team experience and education, not to 
mention all the control variables in 𝑋𝑖. The dummy specifications in Table 3 reveal some important 
additional insights about the differences between mixed-gender versus all-female teams. All-
female teams ask for 23% less money and mixed-gender teams ask for 25% less money.9 The all-
female coefficient for the pre-money valuation is also almost significant, with a P-value of 0.114. 
4.2. Campaign Success 
We now turn to the question of how founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑖) and fundraising strategies 
(𝐺𝑖) affect campaign outcomes. In this subsection we focus on campaign success (𝑆𝑖), in the next 
on funding amounts (𝐹𝑖). It is useful to decompose total effects of 𝑋𝑖 on 𝑆𝑖 into direct and indirect 
effects (the same logic will also apply to 𝐹𝑖). The direct effect of founder characteristics 𝑋𝑖 on 
outcome 𝑆𝑖 is the effect after accounting for all other factors, specifically the fundraising strategy 
𝐺𝑖 and the controls 𝑍𝑖. The indirect effect recognizes that founder characteristics 𝑋𝑖 affect the 
fundraising strategy 𝐺𝑖, which in turn influences the outcome 𝑆𝑖. This decomposition of total effect 
 
8 Regression output is ln(𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙) = 𝑎 + ?̂?𝑋 + 𝑒, thus we use exp(?̂?) when interpreting coefficients. 
9 Note that the P-value is 0.086 for all-female teams and 0.033 for mixed-gender teams. 
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into direct effect and indirect effect is visually illustrated in Figure 2. Chapter 4 of Hayes (2014) 
contains a detailed explanation of this kind of analysis.10 It is natural to interpret indirect effects 
as entrepreneurs’ strategic choices, and direct effects as investor preferences. At the same time, we 
remember that the entrepreneurs’ strategic choices themselves are influenced by their expectations 
of investor demand, as discussed in section 2. 
Figure 2: Simple model of mediation 
 
The empirical model we want to estimate is given by  
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑓𝑆(𝐺𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝑆,𝑖     (2) 
For the direct effect model, we include 𝐺𝑖, and for the total effect model we exclude it. Control 
variables 𝑍𝑖 are always included and capture team age, prior SEEDRS campaign, presence of tax 
breaks and company age, as well as the sector and calendar fixed effects. 
As noted in Section 3.2, three variables describe the fundraising strategy 𝐺𝑖: fundraising goal, 
valuation, and equity offered. However, there are only two choices, because valuation and equity 
offered are mechanically related. To reduce multi-collinearity with the funding goal variable, we 
drop the valuation variable and focus on the equity offered variable (see Panel C of Table 2).  
 
10 The typical method to distinguish between direct and indirect relationships is to run regressions with and without 
the mediator variable G. This is formally called mediation analysis in the statistics literature. In our analysis, we 
follow Baron and Kenny (1986) and other scholars to examine such mediation effects. The total effects is a 
coefficient 𝛿 in regression 𝑆 = 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛿𝑋 + 𝜖𝑥. The direct effect is the coefficient 𝛼 in regression 𝑆 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑋 +
𝛼𝑔𝐺 +  𝜖𝑥,𝑔. If all the relationships are linear, the indirect effect can be estimated as the product 𝛽 × 𝜃, where 𝛽 and  
𝜃 are the coefficients from two regressions, 𝐺 = 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜓𝑥   and 𝑆 = 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜃𝐺 + 𝜓𝑔. Thus, the indirect effect is  
𝛿 − 𝛼, i.e. the difference between the total effect and the direct effect. 
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The first two columns of Table 4 report the total effects, deliberately omitting the fundraising 
strategy variables (𝐺𝑖). The last two columns add the strategy variables and therefore estimate the 
direct effect. Probably the most important finding of Table 4 is that the funding goal variable is 
highly significant and negative. This provides clear evidence that companies face a fundamental 
trade-off. A higher funding goal promises larger funding amounts in case of success (a result we 
will confirm in Table 5). However, setting a higher goal is risky, because it meeting the goal 
becomes more difficult. Table 4 also shows that most founder team characteristics are 
insignificant. The main exception is experience which is positive and significant in the 
continuous model for the direct effect. 
4.3. Fundraising Amounts 
Beyond the question of whether a campaign succeeds or not, our core research question focuses 
on the amount of money actually raised. For this we turn to funding amount (𝐹𝑖) as our dependent 
variable, transformed with natural log. As with campaign success, we exclude 𝐺𝑖 for the total effect 
model and include it for the direct effect model. The control variables 𝑍𝑖 are always included. 
Table 5 shows how the key variables of interest—founder characteristics 𝑋𝑖, fundraising strategy 
𝐺𝑖, and control variables 𝑍𝑖—relate to funding amount 𝐹𝑖. The total effects of experience and 
business education are positive and significant. For example, teams with at least one experienced 
founder raise 39% more than inexperienced teams.11 However, the direct effort model shows 
insignificant coefficients for experience and education. This suggests that their effect is fully 
explained by the indirect effect. That is, teams with more experience or more education raise more 
money because they set higher fundraising goals. Once this is accounted for, there no residual 
direct effect left.  
In the total effect model all-female teams raise 47% less than all-male teams. When we decompose 
this total effect, both the direct and indirect effect of gender are negative. The indirect effect comes 
 
11 Regression output is ln(Funding)=a+bhatX+E, thus we use exp(bhat) when interpreting coefficients. 
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from the lower campaign goals chosen by all-female teams, and account for 31% of the effect. 
After controlling for fundraising strategy (goal and equity offered), the direct effect is that all-
female teams still raise 16% lower amounts. This suggests that all-female teams choosing a safer 
fundraising strategy is one part of what explains why female teams raise less money. The other 
part of the explanation is the direct effect, which suggests that investors provide less funding to 
all-female teams, even after controlling for all these other factors, including the choices of funding 
goals and equity offered. 
The results for mixed-gender teams are subtly different. Such teams raise 28% less than all-male 
teams. However, their direct effect is positive: after controlling for fundraising strategy, mixed-
gender teams raise 10% more than all-male counterparts. Yet it is the indirect effect of a much 
lower goal that accounts for why mixed-gender teams raise less than all-male teams. That is, mixed 
teams raise 38% less funding due to setting a lower goal (the indirect effect). 
In the direct effect model the coefficient on campaign goal is highly significant. Interestingly, it 
not statistically different from 1. This suggests that there is a one-to-one relationship between 
campaign goal and investment raised for successful campaigns, justifying the title “be careful 
what you ask for, as you might get it!” 
One natural concern is that funding amount 𝐹𝑖 is only observed for successful campaigns. We 
might worry about how founder characteristics influence selection into success and bias our 
results when we only consider the sample of successful campaigns. The result that most founder 
team characteristics are insignificant in explaining campaign success (as in Table 4) provides 
first indication that the sample of successful campaigns is largely representative. We performed 
alternative analyses, discussed and reported in the Online Appendix, that formally account for 
potential selection bias by adding a selection equation to the model. We find that this selection 
correction never materially affects any of our results. 
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4.4 Daily Investment Flows 
Our analysis so far examines the effects of founder characteristics and fundraising strategies on 
campaign outcomes. We now exploit some of the richness of the crowdfunding data, which allows 
us to observe the dynamics of the fundraising process. In particular we consider the daily 
investment flows and their determinants.  
Table 6 reports the results from a random effect panel regression of daily investment flows (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡) 
as a function of campaign characteristics (𝐺𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖). Due to the dynamic nature of the sample we 
further add momentum variables (𝑀𝑖,𝑡), described in Section 3.2, that capture time-varying factors 
that may influence investor demand. A prior crowdfunding literature shows that campaign 
momentum can have an important effect on outcomes (see especially Mollick 2014, Vulkan et al. 
2015; Åstebro et al. 2018). The additional time-varying variables that we include pertain to 
weather, competition on the platform, and the broader popularity of equity crowdfunding. 
Specifically we include exogenous (and possibly non-linear) variation in weather which influences 
internet usage, similar to Cardona et al. (2013), Gilchrist and Sands (2016), or Xu (2017). In 
addition, we also consider exogenous activity on the SEEDRS platform. This includes how many 
competing campaigns there are on the platform, and how strong they are in terms of attracting 
investments flows. Additionally, we measure time-varying investor interest, through Google 
searches for the term “equity crowdfunding”, and through the timing of investor tax-incentives at 
the end of the tax year. Finally, we introduce additional panel variables that serve as controls, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡. 
As discussed in Section 3.2, these variables are related to time and include the time trend, fixed 
effects for the day-of-week, and fixed effects for long weekend or a week of public holidays. 
The relevant sample for daily investment flows is from initial investment until either the day the 
campaign reaches its goal (if successful), until the day of last investment (if unsuccessful). What 
happens to successful campaigns after the campaign reaches its goal is something that we analyse 
separately in the next section. Therefore, we estimate the following equation for daily investment 
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flows across all campaigns. As before, we exclude 𝐺𝑖 for the total effect model and include it for 
the direct effect model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑣(𝐺𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑣    (3) 
The results we report in Table 6 show that the momentum variables (𝑀𝑖,𝑡) are generally statistically 
significant determinants of daily investment flows. As expected, investor demand tapers off during 
holidays and at the end of the tax year for campaigns that do not have tax break incentives. On the 
other hand, investor demand picks up on cold and rainy days, likely reflecting investor’s greater 
online presence. Additionally, prior campaign success is a strong determinant of daily investment 
flows, as is the length of time that has passed since the first investment. 
As far as the entrepreneur characteristics, we find that female entrepreneurs face lower daily 
investment flows than male counterparts even after accounting for the amounts that female 
entrepreneurs set as their campaign goals. This suggests that female entrepreneurs both ask for less 
money and also face lower investment flows for a given level of the ask. These two factors together 
explain why campaigns led by female entrepreneurs raise less money. 
4.5. Stopping the Campaign 
Our analysis so far shows that daily investment flows and the funding goal (what the entrepreneurs 
ask for) are the two key dimensions that determine fundraising outcomes. Still, we are left with an 
interesting question whether the amount of money that the entrepreneur asks for reflects what s/he 
really wants? We already saw in our theory discussion of section 2 that entrepreneurs optimally 
ask for less than what they think they can get on average (i.e., 𝛾 < 𝜇). We now ask how much 
additional money different types of entrepreneurs want. To examine this empirically we exploit a 
unique feature of our data, namely the entrepreneurs’ decision when to stop their campaigns.  
Consider a simple analogy of the decision to turn off a tap of water that is filling a bucket. Clearly 
you need to turn off the tap sometime, to take the bucket elsewhere and make use of the water. One 
reason to stop the tap is that the bucket is full, i.e., you don’t any more water. Another reason to 
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stop is that even though water is still flowing, the flow rate is so low that it isn’t worth your time 
anymore. Either way, the more water you need, the longer you will wait before switching off the 
tap. The decision when to turn off the tap therefore reveals something about how much you want 
the water. We now apply the same logic to the stopping decision in equity crowdfunding.  
The entrepreneur takes the decision to stop the campaign (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1). This decision depends on the 
flow rate of investments (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡), as well as all the campaign characteristics (𝐺𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖). The 
investment flow rate is a function of the entrepreneurs’ company characteristics, reflecting investor 
interests. In order to model the entrepreneurs’ stopping decision we thus need a system of two 
equations, one for the entrepreneurs’ stopping decision itself, and one for investors’ endogenous 
investment decisions. Having these two equations helps us to distinguish whether a late stopping 
decision is due to a high level of investor interest, or due to a high demand for additional funds by 
the company.  
To model the stopping decision, the panel sample starts the day after the mandatory cooling off 
period and ends when the campaign stops. The decision to stop at date 𝑡 + 1 (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1) is a 
function of the state of the company at date 𝑡. The panel analysis also uses additional panel 
controls, denoted by 𝑃𝑖,𝑡. We write  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑣(𝐺𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑣    (4) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝(𝐺𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖 , 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝
   (5) 
The first stage is to estimate the investment flow (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡), using the panel version of the momentum 
variables. The second step is to use the instrumented investment flows in the stopping equation. 
To estimate this two-equation model we use a two-stage GLS random effects estimator. In all 
regression results throughout the paper, we also cluster the standard errors at company level to 
take into account repeat campaigns.  
The identifying assumption is that 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 are the instruments for 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡. They directly affect investor 
interest but only affect the entrepreneur’s stopping decision indirectly, through the effect of 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡. 
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While the exclusion restriction can never be proven directly, we believe that it is a reasonable 
assumption in our context. Deadlines for tax credits, for example, are relevant to investors, but not 
the entrepreneurs. The number and strengths of competing fundraising campaigns don’t matter 
directly to the entrepreneur who isn’t investing, but matter indirectly in terms of affecting investor 
interests which may wander between the entrepreneur’s campaign and other competing campaigns. 
Furthermore, Google searches for “equity crowdfunding” in UK are representative of changes in 
investor interest, potentially due to media and marketing, but they should not affect the 
entrepreneur’s stopping decision directly. Moreover, we would argue that the behavioural effects 
of weather conditions are more likely to apply to investors than entrepreneurs.12  
To test our identification approach, we use the standard test for instrument informativeness in the 
first stage. Since the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables and our 
IV model is overidentified, we also test whether the excluded instruments are independent of the 
error process and conclude that overidentifying restrictions (and thus the instruments) are valid.13 
We also test for the informativeness of the instruments (𝑀𝑖,𝑡) and find that the daily tax credit 
incentives and deadlines, competition on the platform, Google search trends, and weather are all 
jointly strongly associated with the investment flows.14 This suggests that the instrumental 
variables are not correlated with the residual term in the second stage, and that the model is not 
mis-specified. One may also be concerned about any survivorship bias within the sample, along 
the lines discussed at the end of section 4.3. As discussed in the Online Appendix, we find that 
selection effects are not a concern in this particular system of equations. Table 7 thus present the 
results from instrumental variable regressions without the selection correction. 
 
12 This last argument strikes us as plausible, but it is not strictly needed. In particular we reran our model allowing 
weather variables to affect both the investment and the stopping decision, finding that none of our results depend on 
this. 
13 With a P-value of 0.7 for the Sargan-Hansen test, we do not reject the null hypothesis that overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. 
14 With a P-value of 0.002 for the Sanderson-Windmeijer F test, we reject the null hypothesis that all the daily 
momentum variables (𝑀𝑖,𝑡) have a coefficient of zero. 
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The first two columns of Table 7 show the results for the investment flow model (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡). While 
there are no significant effects for experience or education, there is a negative effect for female 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, all-female teams attract a lower flow rate of investments that is 
statistically significant. Together with the finding from Section 4.4, this evidence suggests that 
investor have less interest in all-female companies, both before and after they reach the campaign 
goal. Note also that in column 1 the proportion of females has a negative coefficient with a P-value 
of 0.156.  
Table 6 only shows direct effect, which already controls for Funding Goal, as well as the Cooling 
Off amount. Both of these variables are positive and significant. We also find that the number of 
competing SEEDRS campaigns, tax incentives, and Google search trends all predict investment 
flows.  
The third and fourth column of Table 6 show the results for the stopping model (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1). 
Technically this is the second-stage equation of an instrumental variable regression. A first 
important result in columns 3 and 4 is that the endogenous investment variable (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡) has a 
negative coefficient that is highly significant. This suggests that stopping decisions of 
entrepreneurs are sensitive to the flow of money from the investors, as predicted in our water tap 
analogy. Next we note that neither entrepreneurial experience nor business education are 
significant. This suggests that after reaching their goal, there are no significant differences in the 
preferences for additional funds along these dimensions.  
Table 6 reveals some interesting gender effects. In the third column we find a negative and 
significant effect for the fraction of female founders. This says that teams with more female 
founders hold out for longer, i.e., they want more  money and are willing to wait longer to get it. 
In the fourth column the gender coefficients are also negative albeit not statistically significant. 
The P-value on the all-female coefficient is 0.162. We would consider this evidence indicative 
albeit not conclusive. It suggests that while all-female teams ask for less funding at the beginning, 
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and receive less funding during the process, at the end of the campaign it appears that they actually 
want more money. 
It is worth noting that this pattern is consistent with the model predictions about risk-aversion 
discussed in section 2. Unfortunately, our data does not contain a direct measure of risk-aversion, 
so there may well be other factors that also explain this observed pattern. Still, this finding is 
important, because it is hard to reconcile with the alternative hypothesis that female-led companies 
simply have lower capital requirements. If that were the case, then there is no reason to believe 
that female-led ventures would hold out for longer to raise more money at the end of campaigns. 
Our key contribution is thus to identify a pattern of behaviours that suggests that female-led teams 
have higher unmet funding needs. 
5. Robustness and Extensions 
In this section we consider many empirical robustness checks and model extensions that speak to 
the representativeness of the results presented in Section 4. The Online Appendix contains all the 
tables related to the discussion in this section. 
The analysis presented earlier includes all founder team characteristics jointly. Including multiple 
characteristics together allows us to separate effects, for example separate the effect of gender from 
the effect of experience. As a robustness we check that the results are qualitatively similar when 
team characteristics are included one-by-one.  
We performed considerable robustness analysis on our measure of experience. Our base measure 
is based on whether founders have prior founding experiences. We further consider whether their 
prior founding experience was successful or not. Moreover, we also ask whether founders have 
prior experience working in a (successful or unsuccessful) start-up as a non-founder. This gives us 
a 2x2 matrix to work with, distinguishing successful vs. unsuccessful experiences in one 
dimension, and founders vs. non-founders in the second dimension. In our base model we 
presented results for being a founder AND having prior success. This left out founders with no 
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identifiable success, and people that worked in a successful start-up but were not start-up founders. 
We find that adding either or both categories does not substantially change our main results.  
Our base measure for education is whether founders have an MBA. As a robustness we consider 
any post-graduate education. We find that the main pattern of results remains, although the effect 
of post-graduate education on campaign amounts is weaker and in some cases even negative.  
Most of our companies are located in the UK. For robustness we control for whether campaigns 
are denominated in Pounds or Euros, indicating whether the company is operating mainly in the 
UK or not. We find that this currency choice has no material effect on our results. 
Another concern is that our industry controls are not sufficient for capturing heterogenous capital 
intensity. We therefore consider additional data that measure the companies’ business models 
(distinguishing B2B vs. B2C vs. mixed models) and the companies’ model of delivery (digital, 
non-digital, or mixed model). This data is incomplete for unsuccessful campaigns, so we can only 
use it for successful campaigns. Adding it as controls there does not affect any of our main results.  
Our base model controls for the equity offered. For robustness we verify that using valuation 
instead of equity offered yields very similar results. Specially, results are qualitatively similar when 
the equity variable is replaced by (i) the valuation variable, (ii) the residual valuation variable 
(obtained by regressing valuation on goal, in line with the sequential regression approach to 
dealing with multicollinearity), or (iii) when the equity variable is excluded from the specification 
(which is another approach to dealing with multicollinearity).15 
Finally, there is the question of repeat campaigns. Our main analysis controls for having a past 
SEEDRS campaign (approximately 25% of the sample do). As a robustness we also drop all repeat 
campaigns and find that this does not change the main results (apart from some minor loss of 
statistical significance due to the lower number of observations).  
 
15 See Dormann et al. (2013) for a review of these methods. 
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6. Conclusion 
Equity Crowdfunding is becoming a more important way for new businesses to raise funds. 
However, as the industry matures questions are being asked about the overall effectiveness of this 
new medium. A recent 156-page document from the FCA identifies a number of problems and 
proposes solutions to lessons being learned from the last 6 years.16 The report recognizes the 
importance of entrepreneurs being able to raise money on such platforms.  
In this paper we use equity crowdfunding data to consider the relationship between founder team 
characteristics, fundraising strategies, and fundraising outcomes. We leverage the fact that the 
entrepreneurs’ choices are observable in crowdfunding campaigns, and therefore allow us to 
distinguish between what the entrepreneurs ask for, versus what the investors want to give. We 
find that founder teams with more entrepreneurial experience and more business education ask for 
more money, often at higher valuations. Experienced teams are more likely to succeed in their 
campaigns, and end up raising more money, as do the teams with more business education. Female 
teams ask for less money, have the same probability of campaign success, but end up raising less 
money. Interestingly, they also hold out for money longer before closing their campaigns. This 
suggests that even if they ask for less, they actually may want more funding. Overall, the analysis 
points to the importance of entrepreneur’s fundraising strategies, and in particular the setting of 
the fundraising goal. On of the strongest results in the paper is that while setting a higher goal 
reduces the probability of success, it also helps companies to raise more money: “Be careful what 
you ask for, as you might actually get it.” 
Our findings raise important questions about the underlying reasons as to why different 
entrepreneurs chose different fundraising strategies. One important question for future research 
concerns the question of how entrepreneurs determine their fundraising goals. Of particular interest 
 
16 See https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-proposes-changes-rules-crowdfunding-platforms for a short 
summary. 
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is why female founder teams ask for less money: is this mainly driven by expectations of what 
they think they can get (rightly or wrongly), or do other factors also influence this behaviour?  
Another interesting question concerns the dynamics across multiple fundraising events. Our 
current analysis focuses on individual fundraising campaigns as a unit of analysis. Future research 
might investigate how entrepreneurs dynamically adjust their fundraising strategies across 
multiple campaigns, and how they adjust based on the underlying business developments in their 
start-up companies. Finally, there is always the question of how fundraising strategies are related 
to the ultimate success of the company in terms of exit and returns. 
 
7. References 
Adams, Renée B, and V Ragunathan. 2017. "Lehman Sisters." 
Adams, Renée B., and Daniel Ferreira. 2009. "Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance." Journal of Financial Economics 94 (2): 291-309. 
Ahlers, Gerrit K.C., Douglas Cumming, Christina Günther, and Denis Schweizer. 2015. 
"Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding." Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 39 (4): 
955-980. 
Åstebro, Thomas, Manuel Fernández, Stefano Lovo, and Nir Vulkan. 2017. "Herding in Equity 
Crowdfunding." 1-36. 
Atkinson, Stanley M., Samantha Boyce Baird, and Melissa B. Frye. 2003. "Do female mutual 
fund managers manage differently?" Journal of Financial Research 26 (1): 1-18. 
Bapna, Sofia, and Martin Ganco. 2018. "Gender Gaps in Equity Crowdfunding: Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment." 1-39. 
Baron, Reuben M., and David a. Kenny. 1986. "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in 
Social The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: 
Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 51 (6): 1173-1182. 
Bernstein, Shai, Arthur Korteweg, and Kevin Laws. 2017. "Attracting Early-Stage Investors: 
Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment." Journal of Finance 72 (2): 509-538. 
34 
 
Cardona, Juan Camilo, Rade Stanojevic, and Ruben Cuevas. 2013. On Weather and Internet 
Traffic Demand. Vol. 7799, in Passive and Active Measurement, by Juan Camilo 
Cardona, Rade Stanojevic and Ruben Cuevas, edited by Matthew Roughan and Rocky 
Chang, 260-263. Hong Kong: Springer. 
Coleman, Susan, and Alicia Robb. 2009. "A comparison of new firm financing by gender: 
Evidence from the Kauffman Firm Survey data." Small Business Economics 33 (4): 397-
411. 
Colombo, Massimo G., and Luca Grilli. 2005. "Founders' human capital and the growth of new 
technology-based firms: A competence-based view." Research Policy 34 (6): 795-816. 
Croson, Rachel, and Uri Gneezy. 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences." Journal of 
Economic Literature 47 (2): 448-474. 
Dormann, C F, J Elith, S Bacher, C Buchmann, G Carl, G Carré, J R G Marquéz, et al. 2013. 
"Collinearity: A review of methods to deal with it and a simulation study evaluating their 
performance." Ecography 36 (1): 27-46. 
Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman. 2008. Men, Women and Risk Aversion: 
Experimental Evidence. Vol. 1, in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, by 
Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman, 1061-1073. 
Estrin, Saul, and Susanna Khavul. 2015. "Equity Crowdfunding and the socialization of 
entrepreneurial finance." 
Estrin, Saul, Daniel Gozman, and Susanna Khavul. 2018. "The evolution and adoption of equity 
crowdfunding: entrepreneur and investor entry into a new market." Small Business 
Economics (Small Business Economics) (51): 425-439. 
Ewens, Michael, and Richard Townsend. 2019. "Are Early Stage Investors Biased Against 
Women?" Journal of Financial Economics.  
Fairlie, Robert W., and Alicia M. Robb. 2009. "Gender differences in business performance: 
Evidence from the characteristics of business owners survey." Small Business Economics 
33 (4): 375-395. 
Gilchrist, Duncan Sheppard, and Emily Glassberg Sands. 2016. "Something to Talk About: 
Social Spillovers in Movie Consumption." Journal of Political Economy 124 (5): 1339-
1382. 
35 
 
Gimmon, Eli, and Jonathan Levie. 2010. "Founder's human capital, external investment, and the 
survival of new high-technology ventures." Research Policy (Elsevier B.V.) 39 (9): 1214-
1226. 
Gompers, Paul A., and Sophie Q Wang. 2017. "And the Children Shall Lead: Gender Diversity 
and Performance in Venture Capital." NBER. 
Gompers, Paul, Anna Kovner, Josh Lerner, and David Scharfstein. 2010. "Performance 
persistence in entrepreneurship." Journal of Financial Economics (Elsevier) 96 (1): 18-
32. 
Halmari, Ella, Eleanor Sharman, Henry Whorwood, Jake Ford, Tanya Nyamadzawo, Ester 
Simoes, Daniel Osei, and Thomas Sheils. 2017. "The Deal: Equity investment in the UK 
2017." Beauhurst, London. 
Havrylchyk, Olena, and Marianne Verdier. 2018. "The Financial Intermediation Role of the P2P 
Lending Platforms." Comparative Economic Studies (Palgrave Macmillan UK) 60 (1): 
115-130. 
Hayes, Andrew F. 2014. "The Simple Mediation Model." In Introduction to Mediation, 
Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach, by 
Andrew F. Hayes, 85-122. 
Howell, Sabrina T, and Ramana Nanda. 2019. "Networking Frictions in Venture Capital, and the 
Gender Gap in Entrepreneurship." Harvard Business School. 
Hsu, David H. 2007. "Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture 
capital funding." Research Policy 36 (5): 722-741. 
Huang, Jiekun, and Darren J. Kisgen. 2013. "Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives 
overconfident relative to female executives?" Journal of Financial Economics (Elsevier) 
108 (3): 822-839. 
Hudson, Marianne. 2017. "In-Depth Angel Investor Survey Sheds Light On Angel Success." 
Forbes, 12. 
Kaplan, Sarah, and Natassia Walley. 2016. "The Risky Rhetoric of Female Risk Aversion." 
Stanford Social Innovation Review 14 (2). 
Kaplan, Steven N, and Per Strömberg. 2004. "Characteristics, contracts, and actions: Evidence 
from venture capitalist analyses." The Journal of Finance 5. 
Löher, Jonas. 2017. "The interaction of equity crowdfunding platforms and ventures: an analysis 
of the preselection process." Venture Capital (Routledge) 19 (1-2): 51-74. 
36 
 
Marom, Dan, Alicia Robb, and Orly Sade. 2016. "Gender dynamics in crowdfunding 
(Kickstarter): Deals, and taste-based discrimination." 1-75. 
Mohammadi, Ali, and Kourosh Shafi. 2018. "Gender differences in the contribution patterns of 
equity-crowdfunding investors." Small Business Economics (Small Business Economics) 
50 (2): 275-287. 
Mohammadi, Ali, and Kourosh Shafi. 2016. "How Wise Are Crowd? A Comparative Study of 
Crowd and Institutions in Peer-to-Business Online Lending Markets." 1-37. 
Mollick, Ethan. 2014. "The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study." Journal of 
Business Venturing (The Author) 29 (1): 1-16. 
Mollick, Ethan, and Ramana Nanda. 2016. "Wisdom or Madness? Comparing Crowds with 
Expert Evaluation in Funding the Arts." Management Science 62 (6): 1533-1553. 
Robb, Alicia M., and Susan Coleman. 2010. "Financing strategies of new technology-based 
firms: A comparison of women- and men-owned firms." Journal of Technology 
Management & Innovation 5 (1): 1-18. 
Steafel, Eleanor. 2018. "Angel investor Jenny Tooth: 'Women don't ask for the money they 
need'." The Telegraph, 1-6. 
Verheul, Ingrid, and Roy Thurik. 2001. "Start-Up Capital: "Does Gender Matter"?" Small 
Business Economics 16 (February 2001): 329–345. 
Vulkan, Nir, Thomas Åstebro, and Manuel Fernandez Sierra. 2016. "Equity crowdfunding: A 
new phenomena." Journal of Business Venturing Insights 5: 37-49. 
Wang, Wanxin, Ammara Mahmood, Catarina Sismeiro, and Nir Vulkan. 2019. "The evolution of 
equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of angels and the crowd." Research 
Policy (Elsevier) 1-11. 
Wehmeier, Tom. 2017. "The State of European Tech 2017." Atomico, 142. 
Woodridge, Jeffrey. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. 
Xu, Ting. 2017. "Learning from the Crowd: The Feedback Value of Crowdfunding." 
 
 
37 
 
Table 1: Description of variables 
This table lists all of the variable names with their descriptions. It also lists their variable categories, where the index 𝑖 indicates cross-
sectional variation across campaigns, and the index 𝑡 indicates temporal variation in the daily panel.   
Variable Category Description 
Dependent variables 
FUNDING GOAL 𝐺𝑖 Desired campaign investment amount, as natural log. 
VALUATION 𝐺𝑖 Pre-money valuation of the company, as natural log. 
EQUITY OFFERED 𝐺𝑖 Equity offered, as FUNDING GOAL / (FUNDING GOAL + VALUATION); in percent. 
CAMPAIGN 
SUCCESS 
𝑆𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if campaign successfully reaches goal; 0 otherwise. 
FUNDING 
AMOUNT 
𝐹𝑖  Total amount invested in campaign, as natural log. 
INVESTMENT 
FLOW 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 Daily campaign investment flow, as natural log. 
STOP 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 Daily dummy whether the founder has stopped the campaign, once allowed to do so after the cooling 
off period. 
Founder characteristics 
EXPERIENCE (%) 𝑋𝑖 Share of founders in the company's founding team with prior entrepreneurial experience in a start-up 
that experienced an IPO, acquisition, private investment rounds, or business growth. 
EXPERIENCE (D) 𝑋𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if EXPERIENCE (%) > 0; 0 otherwise 
EDUCATION (%) 𝑋𝑖 Share of founders in the company’s founding team with an MBA 
EDUCATION (D) 𝑋𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if EDUCATION (%) > 0; 0 otherwise 
FEMALES (%) 𝑋𝑖 Share of female founders in the company's founding team 
FEMALES ONLY (D) 𝑋𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if FEMALE (%) =1; 0 otherwise 
FEMALES MIXED 
(D) 
𝑋𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if 0 < FEMALE (%) < 1; 0 otherwise 
Control variables 
PRIOR SEEDRS 𝑍𝑖  Dummy variable indicating whether the company had already raised some equity from SEEDRS. 
TEAM SIZE 𝑍𝑖  The number of company founders at the time of the SEEDRS campaign. 
SEIS 𝑍𝑖  Dummy whether the campaign is eligible for the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) tax break. 
EIS 𝑍𝑖  Dummy whether the campaign is eligible for the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) tax break. 
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Variable Category Description 
SECTOR 𝑍𝑖  A series of dummy variables for: Clothing and Home (Clothing & Accessories, Home & Personal, 
Healthcare); 
E-Commerce and Marketing (Advertising & Marketing, Data & Analytics, Content & Information); 
Finance (Finance & payments, Recruitment & Procurement, Property); Food and Drink (Food & 
Beverage);  
Games and Entertainment (Entertainment, Games); Technology (Programming & Security, SaaS/PaaS);  
Transport and Travel (Automotive & Transport, Travel, Leisure & Sport, Energy). 
QUARTER 𝑍𝑖  A series of dummy variables denoting the quarter of campaign start, for the period Q2 2012 to Q2 
2017.  
Momentum variables 
COMPETITION (#) 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  The number of other competing open campaigns on SEEDRS; daily or average over first week of 
campaign. 
COMPETITION (£) 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  The average flow to other competing open campaigns on the platform, as natural log; daily or average 
over first week of campaign. 
DEADLINE*EIS 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  Last three weeks of the tax year and SEIS eligibility, daily or any time during the first week of campaign. 
DEADLINE*SEIS 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  Last three weeks of the tax year and EIS eligibility, daily or any time during the first week of campaign. 
DEADLINE*NONE 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  Last three weeks of the tax year and neither SEIS nor EIS eligibility, daily or any time during the first 
week of campaign.  
GOOGLE TRENDS 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  The number of searches for “equity crowdfunding” on Google in UK; daily or total over first week of 
campaign. 
RAIN 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  Average daily rainfall in London, as natural log; daily or average over first week of campaign. 
TEMP 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑀𝑖  Average daily temperature in London, as dummies in 5°C increments; daily or average over first week 
of campaign. 
Additional panel variables 
WEEK-DAY 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 A series of dummy variables denoting the day of the week. 
TIME TREND 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Time trend. 
HOLIDAYS 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Long weekend or week of public holidays, according to the calendar of UK Bank Holidays. 
COOLING OFF 𝑃𝑖  Investment top-up amount (in addition to the funding goal) received during the campaign's cooling off 
period, as natural log. 
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Table 2: Panel A: Summary statistics for cross-sectional variables 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variable categories 𝐺𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖, 𝐹𝑖, 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖 in the cross-
section of all campaigns.  
 
  
Variable Category Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
FUNDING GOAL G i 11.51 1.2 6.53 14.73 767
VALUATION G i 14.01 1.15 4.38 18.32 767
EQUITY OFFERED G i 9.75 6.88 0.04 99.98 767
CAMPAIGN SUCCESS S i 0.43 0.496 0 1 767
FUNDING AMOUNT F i 11.64 1.47 6.57 15.29 333
EXPERIENCE (%) X i 0.18 0.34 0 1 767
EXPERIENCE (D) X i 0.26 0.44 0 1 767
EDUCATION (%) X i 0.09 0.25 0 1 767
EDUCATION (D) X i 0.13 0.34 0 1 767
FEMALES (%) X i 0.16 0.31 0 1 767
FEMALES ONLY (D) X i 0.09 0.29 0 1 767
FEMALES MIXED (D) X i 0.16 0.36 0 1 767
TEAM SIZE Z i 1.897 0.88 1 5 767
PRIOR SEEDRS Z i 0.26 0.44 0 1 767
SEIS Z i 0.46 0.499 0 1 767
EIS Z i 0.44 0.497 0 1 767
SECTOR: Clothing, Home Z i 0.16 0.36 0 1 767
SECTOR: E-Commerce, Marketing Z i 0.16 0.37 0 1 767
SECTOR: Finance Z i 0.14 0.34 0 1 767
SECTOR: Food, Drink Z i 0.12 0.32 0 1 767
SECTOR: Games, Entertainment Z i 0.103 0.304 0 1 767
SECTOR: Technology Z i 0.18 0.38 0 1 767
SECTOR: Transport, Travel Z i 0.15 0.35 0 1 767
COMPETITION (#) M i 37.79 14.52 8.43 65.29 767
COMPETITION (£) M i 6.56 1.32 1.47 10.83 767
DEADLINE*SEIS M i 0.02 0.16 0 1 767
DEADLINE*EIS M i 0.03 0.18 0 1 767
DEADLINE*NONE M i 0.001 0.04 0 1 767
GOOGLE TRENDS M i 181.59 111.78 0 445 767
RAIN M i -0.03 1.24 -2.3 2.59 767
TEMP <5C M i 0.099 0.299 0 1 767
TEMP 5C-10C M i 0.28 0.45 0 1 767
TEMP 10C-15C M i 0.35 0.48 0 1 767
TEMP 15C-20C M i 0.24 0.43 0 1 767
TEMP >20C M i 0.03 0.18 0 1 767
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Table 2: Panel B: Summary statistics for daily panel variables 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variable categories 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ,  𝑃𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑃𝑖 in 
the overall daily panel sample, which includes both unsuccessful and successful campaigns (before 
and after reaching goal). 
 
 
Variable Category Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
INVESTMENT FLOW Inv i,t 2.29 3.27 0 14.74 45952
STOP Stop i,t 0.02 0.13 0 1 20559
COMPETITION (#) M i,t 38.87 13.99 1 67 45952
COMPETITION (£) M i,t 6.69 1.55 0 12.49 45952
DEADLINE*SEIS M i,t 0.02 0.14 0 1 45952
DEADLINE*EIS M i,t 0.02 0.15 0 1 45952
DEADLINE*NONE M i,t 0.01 0.07 0 1 45952
GOOGLE TRENDS M i,t 26.88 20.26 0 100 45952
RAIN M i,t -0.82 1.65 -2.3 3.87 45952
TEMP <5C M i,t 0.11 0.32 0 1 45952
TEMP 5C-10C M i,t 0.28 0.45 0 1 45952
TEMP 10C-15C M i,t 0.33 0.47 0 1 45952
TEMP 15C-20C M i,t 0.23 0.42 0 1 45952
TEMP 20C-25C M i,t 0.04 0.2 0 1 45952
TEMP >25C M i,t 0.002 0.05 0 1 45952
TIME TREND P i,t 42.53 34.9 1 331 45952
HOLIDAYS P i,t 0.06 0.23 0 1 45952
COOLING OFF P i 0.09 0.17 0 1.29 20559
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Table 2: Panel C: Key pairwise correlations  
This table shows the pairwise correlations for the variable categories 𝐺𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖, 𝐹𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖, and select 𝑍𝑖 in the sample of successful campaigns  
 
  
Variable No. Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
FUNDING GOAL 1 G i 1
VALUATION 2 G i 0.494*** 1
EQUITY OFFERED 3 G i 0.339*** -0.509*** 1
FUNDING AMOUNT 4 F i 0.974*** 0.500*** 0.295*** 1
EXPERIENCE (%) 5 X i 0.113* 0.138* -0.0180 0.101 1
EXPERIENCE (D) 6 X i 0.140* 0.130* -0.00167 0.122* 0.905*** 1
EDUCATION (%) 7 X i 0.137* 0.155** -0.0418 0.141** -0.143** -0.112* 1
EDUCATION (D) 8 X i 0.155** 0.175** -0.0432 0.154** -0.132* -0.0861 0.926*** 1
FEMALES (%) 9 X i -0.162** -0.0671 -0.0495 -0.162** -0.103 -0.124* -0.0193 -0.0176 1
FEMALES ONLY (D) 10 X i -0.118* -0.0566 -0.0200 -0.131* -0.0406 -0.0784 -0.0319 -0.0335 0.875*** 1
FEMALES MIXED (D) 11 X i -0.0839 -0.0116 -0.0670 -0.0719 -0.141* -0.102 -0.00147 0.00643 0.336*** -0.136* 1
TEAM SIZE 12 Z i 0.0859 0.0836 -0.00514 0.0675 -0.219*** -0.0446 -0.0513 0.0414 -0.0936 -0.263*** 0.441*** 1
PRIOR SEEDRS 13 Z i -0.301*** 0.0465 -0.271*** -0.290*** 0.0740 0.0350 -0.0536 -0.0635 -0.0322 -0.0162 -0.0112 -0.0386 1
SEIS 14 Z i -0.353*** -0.537*** 0.108* -0.358*** -0.186*** -0.177** -0.0936 -0.108* 0.00900 -0.0407 0.110* 0.00205 -0.0980 1
EIS 15 Z i 0.329*** 0.557*** -0.165** 0.341*** 0.165** 0.153** 0.0271 0.0479 -0.00418 0.0389 -0.0869 0.00455 0.112* -0.878*** 1
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Table 3: Determinants of fundraising strategies 
This table reports OLS regressions for the campaign goal, valuation, and equity offered, in the 
cross-sectional sample of all campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team 
characteristics (𝑋𝑖), and control variables (𝑍𝑖). All variables are described in Table 1. T-statistics 
are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the company-level to take into account 
repeat campaigns. 
 
  
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.287** 0.197** 0.153 0.071 0.888 0.722
(2.23) (2.06) (1.25) (0.76) (1.20) (1.26)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.420** 0.309** 0.480*** 0.399*** -1.098 -0.935
(2.55) (2.64) (3.38) (3.52) (-1.24) (-1.34)
FEMALES (%) -0.353** -0.164* -0.442
(-2.57) (-1.77) (-0.58)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.267* -0.153 -0.153
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-0.18)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.293** -0.060 -1.037
(-2.14) (-0.67) (-1.50)
TEAM SIZE 0.122** 0.130** 0.095** 0.073 0.069 0.217
(2.88) (2.70) (2.47) (1.62) (0.25) (0.72)
PRIOR SEEDRS -0.914*** -0.885*** -0.080 -0.079 -3.677*** -3.584***
(-9.27) (-9.01) (-1.21) (-1.17) (-7.27) (-7.04)
SEIS -0.677*** -0.676*** -0.687*** -0.698*** -0.262 -0.212
(-4.61) (-4.68) (-3.64) (-3.76) (-0.20) (-0.16)
EIS 0.233 0.216 0.372* 0.363* -0.822 -0.841
(1.54) (1.45) (1.84) (1.82) (-0.60) (-0.61)
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.346 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107
Funding Goal Equity OfferedPre-money Valuation
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Table 4: Determinants of campaign success 
This table reports Probit regressions for campaign success (𝑆𝑖) in the cross-sectional sample of all 
campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑖), and control 
variables (𝑍𝑖). The direct effect regressions further include fundraising strategies (𝐺𝑖). All variables 
are described in Table 1. T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the 
company-level to take into account repeat campaigns. 
 
  
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.270 0.150 0.327* 0.186
(1.61) (1.18) (1.95) (1.45)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.062 -0.034 0.152 0.029
(0.25) (-0.20) (0.63) (0.17)
FEMALES (%) -0.184 -0.248
(-1.09) (-1.48)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.131 -0.173
(-0.70) (-0.94)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.179
(-0.80) (-1.17)
FUNDING GOAL -0.201*** -0.194**
(-3.36) (-3.25)
EQUITY OFFERED 0.007 0.007
(0.83) (0.76)
TEAM SIZE 0.030 0.032 0.055 0.058
(0.44) (0.43) (0.82) (0.79)
PRIOR SEEDRS 1.066*** 1.079*** 0.941*** 0.961***
(8.78) (8.81) (7.12) (7.19)
SEIS 0.410** 0.391* 0.284 0.268
(2.02) (1.93) (1.39) (1.32)
EIS 0.680*** 0.666*** 0.756*** 0.735***
(3.49) (3.43) (4.02) (3.94)
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.198 0.211 0.209
Campaign Success
Total effect Direct effect
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Table 5: Determinants of funding amount 
This table reports OLS regressions for the funding amount (𝐹𝑖) in the cross-sectional sample of 
all successful campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑖), 
and control variables (𝑍𝑖). The direct effect regressions further include fundraising strategies 
(𝐺𝑖). All variables are described in Table 1. T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are 
clustered at the company-level to take into account repeat campaigns.  
  
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.439* 0.329* -0.053 -0.060
(1.92) (1.82) (-1.00) (-1.47)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.644* 0.486** 0.014 -0.010
(1.86) (2.18) (0.19) (-0.19)
FEMALES (%) -0.686** -0.083
(-3.15) (-1.26)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.628** -0.179**
(-2.49) (-2.57)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.333 0.092*
(-1.22) (1.72)
FUNDING GOAL 1.032*** 1.035***
(60.37) (56.89)
EQUITY OFFERED -0.006* -0.005*
(-1.88) (-1.86)
TEAM SIZE 0.120 0.101 -0.029 -0.057**
(1.63) (1.11) (-1.47) (-2.73)
PRIOR SEEDRS -1.000*** -0.984*** 0.015 0.017
(-7.33) (-7.27) (0.39) (0.44)
SEIS -0.531 -0.531 0.091 0.078
(-1.43) (-1.44) (1.29) (1.15)
EIS 0.365 0.355 0.084 0.087
(0.98) (0.97) (1.28) (1.36)
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N total 333 333 333 333
R squared 0.316 0.314 0.952 0.954
Funding Received
Total effect Direct effect
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Table 6: Determinants of daily investment flows 
This table reports random effects panel regressions for daily investment flows (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡). The 
sample includes all campaigns and includes investment from the start of campaign to reaching 
goal (for successful campaigns) or last investment (for unsuccessful campaigns). The 
explanatory variables are founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑖), control variables (𝑍𝑖), fundraising 
strategies (𝐺𝑖), and panel variables (𝑃𝑖,𝑡). The explanatory variables further include daily 
momentum variables (𝑀𝑖,𝑡). All variables are described in Table 1. T-statistics are in parentheses 
and are clustered at company level to take into account repeat campaigns. 
 
  
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.488 0.245 0.396 0.177
(1.45) (0.92) (1.17) (0.67)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.471 0.116 0.420 0.077
(0.94) (0.32) (0.86) (0.21)
FEMALES (%) -0.812** -0.736**
(-2.61) (-2.38)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.818** -0.756**
(-2.41) (-2.22)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.201 -0.124
(-0.69) (-0.43)
FUNDING GOAL 0.240** 0.262**
(2.04) (2.20)
EQUITY OFFERED 0.033 0.031
(1.40) (1.34)
TEAM SIZE -0.002 -0.039 -0.037 -0.078
(-0.02) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.50)
PRIOR SEEDRS 1.254*** 1.269*** 1.573*** 1.598***
(4.79) (4.82) (5.48) (5.54)
SEIS 0.371 0.313 0.546* 0.504
(1.17) (1.01) (1.72) (1.60)
EIS 1.261*** 1.237*** 1.223*** 1.197***
(3.92) (3.93) (4.14) (4.11)
HOLIDAYS -0.349*** -0.350*** -0.349*** -0.349***
(-4.95) (-4.95) (-4.95) (-4.95)
continued on next page…
Investment Flow
Total effect Direct effect
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Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
continued from previous page…
COMPETITION (#) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.45)
COMPETITION (£) 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
(1.43) (1.43) (1.44) (1.44)
DEADLINE*SEIS -0.043 -0.042 -0.044 -0.044
(-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.29)
DEADLINE*EIS 0.204 0.205 0.203 0.204
(1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.01)
DEADLINE*NONE -0.677* -0.678* -0.678* -0.679*
(-1.84) (-1.84) (-1.84) (-1.84)
GOOGLE TRENDS 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.41) (1.41) (1.42) (1.42)
RAIN 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014*
(1.72) (1.71) (1.72) (1.72)
TEMP: <5C 0.129* 0.129* 0.129* 0.129*
(1.74) (1.74) (1.73) (1.73)
TEMP: 5C to 10C 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039
(0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.61)
TEMP: 15C to 20C -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.05)
TEMP: >20C -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 -0.086
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.87)
TIME TREND -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-3.45) (-3.45) (-3.46) (-3.46)
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
WEEK-DAY Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35035 35035 35035 35035
N campaigns 719 719 719 719
Overall R squared 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.082
Investment Flow
Total effect Direct effect
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Table 7: Determinants of campaign stopping decisions 
This table reports two-stage GLS (random effects with IV) panel regression for the stopping 
dummy (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1) with instrumented lagged daily investment flows. The sample includes only 
successful campaigns, and starts after the cooling off period. The explanatory variables in the 
(2nd stage) stopping regression include the lagged daily investment flows (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡), founder team 
characteristics (𝑋𝑖), control variables (𝑍𝑖), fundraising strategies (𝐺𝑖), and panel variables (𝑃𝑖,𝑡). 
Daily investment flows (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡) are instrumented with a (1
st stage) regression that includes all 
variables from the 2nd stage, as well as the daily momentum variables (𝑀𝑖,𝑡). All variables are 
described in Table 1. T-statistics are in parentheses and are clustered at company level to take 
into account repeat campaigns. 
 
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
INSTRUMENTED FLOW -0.037*** -0.037***
(-3.57) (-3.60)
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.095 -0.176 0.042 0.025
(0.26) (-0.60) (1.39) (0.91)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.028 -0.358 -0.012 -0.023
(0.07) (-1.18) (-0.37) (-0.89)
FEMALES (%) -0.514 -0.058*
(-1.42) (-1.80)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.979** -0.052
(-2.58) (-1.40)
FEMALES MIXED (D) 0.361 -0.028
(1.04) (-0.83)
FUNDING GOAL 0.771*** 0.805*** -0.001 0.001
(6.71) (7.14) (-0.04) (0.06)
EQUITY OFFERED 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.20) (0.15) (0.89) (0.86)
COOLING OFF 1.529** 1.369* 0.170** 0.171**
(2.01) (1.84) (2.50) (2.50)
TEAM SIZE -0.157 -0.297** -0.014 -0.014
(-1.20) (-2.10) (-1.07) (-1.00)
PRIOR SEEDRS -0.171 -0.160 0.012 0.014
(-0.60) (-0.56) (0.47) (0.53)
SEIS 0.364 0.213 0.037 0.035
(0.83) (0.50) (0.78) (0.72)
EIS 0.113 0.089 -0.038 -0.039
(0.27) (-0.21) (-0.78) (-0.80)
HOLIDAYS -0.285* -0.285* -0.028** -0.028**
(1.74) (1.74) (-3.02) (-3.03)
MOMENTUM VARIABLES Yes Yes
TIME TREND Yes Yes Yes Yes
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
WEEK-DAY Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7814 7814 7814 7814
N successful 321 321 321 321
Between R-squared 0.154 0.152
0.703 0.71
0.002 0.002Sanderson-Windmeijer F informativeness test
Flow (1st stage) Stop (2nd stage)
direct effect direct effect
Sargan-Hansen overidentification test
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Appendix A: Abridged Main and Robustness Empirical Results 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
This table lists all of the variable names, with their descriptions, that are in addition to Table 1 presented in the main text. As in Table 1, index 𝑖𝑖 indicates cross-
sectional variation across campaigns, and the index 𝑡𝑡 indicates temporal variation in the daily panel.   
Variable Category Descrip�on 
Founder characteristics 
EXPERIENCE-2 (%) 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 Share of founders in the company's founding team with either: prior experience founding a start-up, or 
experience working in a company that experienced an IPO, acquisi�on, private investment rounds, or business 
growth. 
EXPERIENCE-2 (D) 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if EXPERIENCE-2 (%) > 0; 0 otherwise 
EDUCATION-2 (%) 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 Share of founders in the company’s founding team with a postgraduate degree (Master or PhD) 
EDUCATION-2 (D) 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 Dummy variable = 1 if EDUCATION-2 (%) > 0; 0 otherwise 
Control variables 
BUSINESS MODEL 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 A series of dummy variables for the companies’ business models: B2B, B2C, mixed B2B and B2C, and unknown 
model. 
DELIVERY MODE 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 A series of dummy variables for the companies’ mode of delivery: Digital, Non-Digital, mixed Digital and Non-
Digital, and unknown mode of delivery. 
CURRENCY 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 Dummy variable =1 if the campaign currency is EUR, 0 if GBP. 
RESIDUAL VALUATION 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 Residual term in the regression of VALUATION on FUNDING GOAL. 
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Table A2. Descriptions of Tables by Panel 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered 
These tables report OLS regressions for the campaign goal, valuation, and equity offered, in the cross-
sectional sample of all campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), 
control variables (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), and additional variables as indicated. All variables are described in Table 1 and 
Table 1A. T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the company-level to take into 
account repeat campaigns. 
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received 
These table report Probit regressions for campaign success (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) and OLS regressions for the funding amount 
(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) in the cross-sectional sample of all campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team 
characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), control variables (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), and additional variables as indicated. The direct effect 
regressions further include fundraising strategies (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖). All variables are described in Table 1 and Table 1A. 
T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the company-level to take into account 
repeat campaigns. 
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions 
These tables first report the random effects panel regressions for daily investment flows (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). The 
sample includes all campaigns and includes investment from the start of campaign to reaching goal (for 
successful campaigns) or last investment (for unsuccessful campaigns). The explanatory variables are 
founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), control variables (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), fundraising strategies (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖), panel variables (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), 
and additional variables as indicated. The explanatory variables further include daily momentum variables 
(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡).  
Next, the tables report only the second stage of a two-stage GLS (random effects with IV) panel 
regression for the stopping dummy (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) with instrumented lagged daily investment flows. The 
sample includes only successful campaigns, and starts after the cooling off period. The explanatory 
variables in the (2nd stage) stopping regression include the lagged daily investment flows (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), founder 
team characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), control variables (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), fundraising strategies (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖), panel variables (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), and 
additional variables as indicated. Daily investment flows (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) are instrumented with a (1st stage) 
regression that includes all variables from the 2nd stage, as well as the daily momentum variables (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). 
This 1st stage regression is not shown. 
All variables are described in Table 1 and Table 1A. T-statistics are in parentheses and are clustered at 
company level to take into account repeat campaigns. 
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Table A3. Streamlined Main Results 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.287** 0.197** 0.153 0.071 0.888 0.722
(2.23) (2.06) (1.25) (0.76) (1.20) (1.26)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.420** 0.309** 0.480*** 0.399*** -1.098 -0.935
(2.55) (2.64) (3.38) (3.52) (-1.24) (-1.34)
FEMALES (%) -0.353** -0.164* -0.442
(-2.57) (-1.77) (-0.58)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.267* -0.153 -0.153
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-0.18)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.293** -0.060 -1.037
(-2.14) (-0.67) (-1.50)
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.344 0.441 0.441 0.107 0.108
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.270 0.150 0.327* 0.186 0.439* 0.329* -0.053 -0.060
(1.61) (1.18) (1.95) (1.45) (1.92) (1.82) (-1.00) (-1.47)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.062 -0.034 0.152 0.029 0.644* 0.486** 0.014 -0.010
(0.25) (-0.20) (0.63) (0.17) (1.86) (2.18) (0.19) (-0.19)
FEMALES (%) -0.184 -0.248 -0.686** -0.083
(-1.09) (-1.48) (-3.15) (-1.26)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.131 -0.173 -0.628** -0.179**
(-0.70) (-0.94) (-2.49) (-2.57)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.179 -0.333 0.092*
(-0.80) (-1.17) (-1.22) (1.72)
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.181 0.179 0.192 0.190 0.316 0.314 0.952 0.954
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.488 0.245 0.396 0.177 0.042 0.025
(1.45) (0.92) (1.17) (0.67) (1.39) (0.91)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.471 0.116 0.420 0.077 -0.012 -0.023
(0.94) (0.32) (0.86) (0.21) (-0.37) (-0.89)
FEMALES (%) -0.812** -0.736** -0.058*
(-2.61) (-2.38) (-1.80)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.818** -0.756** -0.052
(-2.41) (-2.22) (-1.40)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.201 -0.124 -0.028
(-0.69) (-0.43) (-0.83)
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
N groups 719 719 719 719 321 321
Between R-squared 0.154 0.152
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
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Table A4. Each founder characteristic included separately 
 
  
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE-2 (%, D) 0.288** 0.212** 0.132 0.065 1.012 0.819
(2.17) (2.14) (1.07) (0.69) (1.38) (1.43)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.374* 0.297* 0.456** 0.391*** -1.228 -0.953
(2.26) (2.54) (3.26) (3.51) (-1.40) (-1.38)
FEMALES (%) -0.380** -0.175 -0.553
(-2.76) (-1.87) (-0.73)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.262 -0.141 -0.228
(-1.68) (-1.45) (-0.27)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.309* -0.0735 -1.055
(-2.20) (-0.81) (-1.52)
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE-2 (%, D) 0.283* 0.164 0.335** 0.199 0.451* 0.362* -0.046 -0.049
(1.69) (1.28) (1.99) (1.54) (1.87) (1.95) (-0.87) (-1.20)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.0171 -0.0458 0.0879 0.00902 0.557 0.453* 0.0283 0.00331
(0.07) (-0.27) (0.37) (0.05) (1.60) (2.04) (0.39) (0.07)
FEMALES (%) -0.213 -0.277 -0.769*** -0.0756
(-1.27) (-1.66) (-3.51) (-1.15)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.146 -0.183 -0.721** -0.167*
(-0.78) (-1.00) (-2.95) (-2.45)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.124 -0.179 -0.362 0.0956
(-0.84) (-1.19) (-1.27) (1.77)
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE-2 (%, D) 0.516 0.285 0.416 0.210 0.048 0.030
(1.50) (1.06) (1.21) (0.79) (1.56) (1.09)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.386 0.074 0.337 0.035 -0.022 -0.026
(0.76) (0.20) (0.68) (0.10) (-0.68) (-1.03)
FEMALES (%) -0.854** -0.762** -0.062*
(-2.78) (-2.49) (-1.92)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.829** -0.763** -0.056
(-2.47) (-2.26) (-1.49)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.186 -0.102 -0.029
(-0.66) (-0.36) (-0.87)
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A5. Founding company or startup success 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE-2 (%, D) 0.186* 0.143* 0.105 0.053 0.629 0.408
(1.85) (1.67) (1.08) (0.70) (0.93) (0.78)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.398** 0.299** 0.468*** 0.394*** -1.162 -0.960
(2.41) (2.57) (3.32) (3.51) (-1.34) (-1.40)
FEMALES (%) -0.375** -0.178* -0.483
(-2.80) (-1.94) (-0.63)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.280* -0.159* -0.197
(-1.86) (-1.65) (-0.23)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.316** -0.072 -1.080
(-2.26) (-0.81) (-1.54)
N 770 770 770 770 770 770
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.342 0.441 0.442 0.104 0.104
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE-2 (%, D) 0.068 0.083 0.101 0.111 0.309 0.173 -0.089* -0.100**
(0.52) (0.76) (0.78) (1.01) (1.47) (0.96) (-1.90) (-2.62)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.034 -0.037 0.116 0.023 0.611* 0.471** 0.005 -0.019
(0.14) (-0.22) (0.48) (0.13) (1.80) (2.14) (0.07) (-0.36)
FEMALES (%) -0.204 -0.270 -0.771*** -0.070
(-1.21) (-1.61) (-3.65) (-1.11)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.140 -0.183 -0.699** -0.166**
(-0.74) (-0.98) (-2.97) (-2.51)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.136 -0.197 -0.386 0.112**
(-0.92) (-1.31) (-1.31) (2.03)
N 770 770 770 770 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.179 0.179 0.190 0.190 0.312 0.307 0.953 0.954
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE-2 (%, D) -0.166 -0.130 -0.223 -0.174 -0.035 -0.028
(-0.67) (-0.59) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-1.28) (-1.12)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.395 0.099 0.347 0.061 -0.031 -0.031
(0.81) (0.27) (0.73) (0.17) (-0.94) (-1.19)
FEMALES (%) -0.850** -0.764** -0.060*
(-2.75) (-2.49) (-1.78)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.843** -0.776** -0.057
(-2.46) (-2.27) (-1.47)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.200 -0.115 -0.023
(-0.71) (-0.41) (-0.66)
N 35176 35176 35176 35176 7814 7814
N groups 722 722 722 722 321 321
Between R-squared 0.151 0.150
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A6. Postgraduate degree 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.279** 0.205** 0.122 0.048 1.066 0.936*
(2.20) (2.15) (1.01) (0.52) (1.53) (1.77)
EDUCATION-2 (%, D) -0.016 -0.044 0.157** 0.116* -1.612** -1.473**
(-0.14) (-0.53) (2.01) (1.72) (-3.13) (-3.15)
FEMALES (%) -0.318** -0.139 -0.375
(-2.27) (-1.56) (-0.50)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.222 -0.094 -0.285
(-1.39) (-1.00) (-0.33)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.286** -0.111 -0.588
(-2.17) (-1.28) (-0.92)
N 755 755 755 755 755 755
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.335 0.488 0.485 0.136 0.139
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.238 0.143 0.291* 0.180 0.361 0.294 -0.065 -0.069
(1.42) (1.12) (1.74) (1.40) (1.60) (1.62) (-1.17) (-1.65)
EDUCATION-2 (%, D) 0.070 0.145 0.061 0.137 -0.076 -0.177 -0.044 -0.089**
(0.54) (1.33) (0.47) (1.23) (-0.35) (-1.10) (-0.93) (-2.34)
FEMALES (%) -0.154 -0.202 -0.692** -0.084
(-0.91) (-1.19) (-3.07) (-1.25)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.104 -0.129 -0.666** -0.189**
(-0.55) (-0.69) (-2.61) (-2.72)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.112 -0.168 -0.294 0.093*
(-0.75) (-1.10) (-1.13) (1.75)
N 755 755 755 755 326 326 326 326
Adjusted R squared 0.184 0.185 0.194 0.194 0.301 0.301 0.953 0.955
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.339 0.174 0.254 0.111 0.049 0.028
(1.03) (0.66) (0.77) (0.43) (1.61) (0.97)
EDUCATION-2 (%, D) -0.053 0.035 -0.034 0.055 0.023 0.008
(-0.20) (0.16) (-0.13) (0.26) (0.84) (0.28)
FEMALES (%) -0.832** -0.750** -0.059*
(-2.68) (-2.41) (-1.89)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.827** -0.765** -0.052
(-2.42) (-2.20) (-1.39)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.221 -0.153 -0.034
(-0.77) (-0.54) (-1.05)
N 34294 34294 34294 34294 7621 7621
N groups 708 708 708 708 314 314
Between R-squared 0.161 0.157
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A7. Dropping repeat campaigns 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.241** 0.158* 0.113 0.045 0.844 0.709
(2.11) (1.79) (0.93) (0.47) (1.02) (1.10)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.310** 0.247** 0.469*** 0.395*** -1.805** -1.380**
(2.52) (2.65) (3.58) (3.61) (-2.25) (-1.99)
FEMALES (%) -0.231** -0.124 -0.257
(-2.20) (-1.27) (-0.30)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.202* -0.111 -0.188
(-1.71) (-1.09) (-0.20)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.150 -0.058 -0.589
(-1.37) (-0.56) (-0.71)
N 570 570 570 570 570 570
Adjusted R-squared 0.399 0.397 0.417 0.418 0.056 0.055
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.282 0.194 0.321* 0.217 0.566** 0.376* 0.054 -0.006
(1.57) (1.38) (1.76) (1.53) (2.32) (1.77) (0.82) (-0.12)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.286 0.228 0.361 0.286 0.725** 0.519** 0.182 0.081
(1.19) (1.27) (1.50) (1.57) (2.63) (2.26) (1.52) (1.04)
FEMALES (%) -0.098 -0.137 -0.372* -0.093
(-0.52) (-0.72) (-1.74) (-1.04)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.164 -0.200 -0.394 -0.192**
(-0.78) (-0.95) (-1.46) (-2.11)
FEMALES MIXED (D) 0.072 0.051 -0.156 0.041
(0.41) (0.29) (-0.56) (0.54)
N 570 570 570 570 185 185 185 185
Adjusted R squared 0.119 0.120 0.125 0.126 0.415 0.407 0.937 0.937
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.475 0.294 0.382 0.224 0.041 0.039
(1.25) (1.01) (1.01) (0.77) (1.04) (1.20)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.607 0.425 0.632 0.441 -0.055 -0.037
(1.36) (1.23) (1.40) (1.28) (-1.45) (-1.36)
FEMALES (%) -0.625* -0.582* -0.042
(-1.82) (-1.74) (-1.09)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.708* -0.660* -0.004
(-1.92) (-1.83) (-0.09)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.052 -0.018 -0.038
(-0.17) (-0.06) (-1.03)
N 28991 28991 28991 28991 4466 4466
N groups 542 542 542 542 183 183
Between R-squared 0.239 0.240
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
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Table A8. Adding customer base and mode of delivery as controls  
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.306** 0.208** 0.160 0.074 0.975 0.805
(2.34) (2.17) (1.31) (0.80) (1.30) (1.41)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.430** 0.314** 0.453*** 0.386*** -0.889 -0.811
(2.59) (2.68) (3.32) (3.51) (-1.09) (-1.25)
FEMALES (%) -0.372** -0.163* -0.561
(-2.77) (-1.77) (-0.74)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.288* -0.146 -0.362
(-1.92) (-1.52) (-0.43)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.292** -0.069 -0.942
(-2.18) (-0.78) (-1.40)
BUSINESS MODEL Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DELIVERY MODE Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.342 0.342 0.449 0.450 0.117 0.118
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.254 0.196 0.307 0.226 0.472** 0.333* -0.046 -0.055
(1.18) (1.09) (1.42) (1.26) (1.98) (1.84) (-0.87) (-1.30)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.818** 0.366 0.851** 0.388 0.687** 0.494** 0.036 0.006
(2.44) (1.53) (2.60) (1.62) (2.04) (2.23) (0.47) (0.11)
FEMALES (%) -0.043 -0.116 -0.734** -0.092
(-0.19) (-0.51) (-3.32) (-1.47)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.093 -0.140 -0.654** -0.190**
(-0.39) (-0.59) (-2.75) (-2.92)
FEMALES MIXED (D) 0.151 0.108 -0.382 0.096*
(0.72) (0.50) (-1.40) (1.80)
BUSINESS MODEL Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DELIVERY MODE Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.645 0.643 0.647 0.645 0.314 0.310 0.952 0.954
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.285 0.140 0.168 0.056 0.045 0.025
(1.11) (0.68) (0.66) (0.27) (1.54) (0.95)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.810** 0.348 0.711** 0.274 -0.018 -0.029
(2.19) (1.21) (2.03) (1.00) (-0.48) (-0.98)
FEMALES (%) -0.693** -0.586** -0.055
(-3.03) (-2.63) (-1.64)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.798*** -0.705** -0.045
(-3.33) (-2.99) (-1.14)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.018 0.064 -0.040
(-0.08) (0.28) (-1.16)
BUSINESS MODEL Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DELIVERY MODE Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
N groups 719 719 719 719 321 321
Between R-squared 0.204 0.204
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
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Table A9. Adding currency as control 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.277** 0.190** 0.161 0.077 0.738 0.618
(2.16) (2.00) (1.31) (0.82) (0.98) (1.06)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.424** 0.311** 0.477*** 0.397*** -1.042 -0.902
(2.61) (2.68) (3.35) (3.48) (-1.19) (-1.29)
FEMALES (%) -0.352** -0.165* -0.420
(-2.56) (-1.78) (-0.55)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.269* -0.151 -0.186
(-1.73) (-1.56) (-0.22)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.285** -0.067 -0.919
(-2.08) (-0.77) (-1.35)
CURRENCY Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.344 0.344 0.441 0.442 0.113 0.114
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.271 0.151 0.326* 0.185 0.380* 0.296 -0.060 -0.064
(1.61) (1.18) (1.94) (1.45) (1.65) (1.64) (-1.12) (-1.55)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.061 -0.034 0.152 0.029 0.684** 0.489** 0.020 -0.009
(0.25) (-0.20) (0.64) (0.17) (2.15) (2.29) (0.26) (-0.17)
FEMALES (%) -0.184 -0.248 -0.726** -0.090
(-1.09) (-1.48) (-3.32) (-1.35)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.131 -0.173 -0.662** -0.184**
(-0.70) (-0.94) (-2.62) (-2.63)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.178 -0.351 0.088*
(-0.80) (-1.16) (-1.29) (1.66)
CURRENCY Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.181 0.179 0.192 0.190 0.326 0.322 0.953 0.954
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.468 0.231 0.384 0.167 0.034 0.021
(1.38) (0.87) (1.13) (0.63) (1.13) (0.77)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.481 0.124 0.425 0.081 -0.009 -0.024
(0.96) (0.34) (0.87) (0.23) (-0.25) (-0.90)
FEMALES (%) -0.812** -0.735** -0.067**
(-2.61) (-2.39) (-2.04)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.824** -0.760** -0.061
(-2.42) (-2.24) (-1.59)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.187 -0.115 -0.032
(-0.65) (-0.40) (-0.97)
CURRENCY Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
N groups 719 719 719 719 321 321
Between R-squared 0.164 0.163
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A10. Valuation instead of equity 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.287** 0.197** 0.153 0.071 0.888 0.722
(2.23) (2.06) (1.25) (0.76) (1.20) (1.26)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.420** 0.309** 0.480*** 0.399*** -1.098 -0.935
(2.55) (2.64) (3.38) (3.52) (-1.24) (-1.34)
FEMALES (%) -0.353** -0.164* -0.442
(-2.57) (-1.77) (-0.58)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.267* -0.153 -0.153
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-0.18)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.293** -0.060 -1.037
(-2.14) (-0.67) (-1.50)
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.344 0.441 0.441 0.107 0.108
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.270 0.150 0.330** 0.187 0.439* 0.329* -0.053 -0.060
(1.61) (1.18) (1.96) (1.46) (1.92) (1.82) (-1.00) (-1.43)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.062 -0.034 0.154 0.032 0.644* 0.486** 0.021 -0.005
(0.25) (-0.20) (0.64) (0.19) (1.86) (2.18) (0.28) (-0.10)
FEMALES (%) -0.184 -0.246 -0.686** -0.086
(-1.09) (-1.45) (-3.15) (-1.29)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.131 -0.171 -0.628** -0.183**
(-0.70) (-0.92) (-2.49) (-2.61)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.178 -0.333 0.094*
(-0.80) (-1.16) (-1.22) (1.76)
FUNDING GOAL No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
VALUATION No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.181 0.179 0.192 0.190 0.316 0.314 0.952 0.953
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.488 0.245 0.410 0.185 0.041 0.025
(1.45) (0.92) (1.21) (0.70) (1.37) (0.89)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.471 0.116 0.405 0.068 -0.014 -0.025
(0.94) (0.32) (0.83) (0.19) (-0.44) (-0.96)
FEMALES (%) -0.812** -0.725** -0.058*
(-2.61) (-2.32) (-1.79)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.818** -0.748** -0.052
(-2.41) (-2.17) (-1.38)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.201 -0.126 -0.028
(-0.69) (-0.44) (-0.85)
FUNDING GOAL No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
VALUATION No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
N groups 719 719 719 719 321 321
Between R-squared 0.152 0.151
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A11. Residual valuation instead of equity 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.287** 0.197** 0.153 0.071 0.888 0.722
(2.23) (2.06) (1.25) (0.76) (1.20) (1.26)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.420** 0.309** 0.480*** 0.399*** -1.098 -0.935
(2.55) (2.64) (3.38) (3.52) (-1.24) (-1.34)
FEMALES (%) -0.353** -0.164* -0.442
(-2.57) (-1.77) (-0.58)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.267* -0.153 -0.153
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-0.18)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.293** -0.060 -1.037
(-2.14) (-0.67) (-1.50)
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.344 0.441 0.441 0.107 0.108
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.270 0.150 0.330** 0.187 0.439* 0.329* -0.053 -0.060
(1.61) (1.18) (1.96) (1.46) (1.92) (1.82) (-1.00) (-1.43)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.062 -0.034 0.154 0.032 0.644* 0.486** 0.021 -0.005
(0.25) (-0.20) (0.64) (0.19) (1.86) (2.18) (0.28) (-0.10)
FEMALES (%) -0.184 -0.246 -0.686** -0.086
(-1.09) (-1.45) (-3.15) (-1.29)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.131 -0.171 -0.628** -0.183**
(-0.70) (-0.92) (-2.49) (-2.61)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.178 -0.333 0.094*
(-0.80) (-1.16) (-1.22) (1.76)
FUNDING GOAL No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
RESIDUAL VALUATION No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.181 0.179 0.192 0.190 0.316 0.314 0.952 0.953
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.488 0.245 0.352 0.155 0.042 0.026
(1.45) (0.92) (1.05) (0.60) (1.39) (0.93)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.471 0.116 0.295 -0.034 -0.012 -0.022
(0.94) (0.32) (0.62) (-0.10) (-0.36) (-0.86)
FEMALES (%) -0.812** -0.683** -0.058*
(-2.61) (-2.19) (-1.79)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.818** -0.705** -0.052
(-2.41) (-2.05) (-1.37)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.201 -0.116 -0.029
(-0.69) (-0.40) (-0.88)
FUNDING GOAL No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
RESIDUAL VALUATION No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
N groups 719 719 719 719 321 321
Between R-squared 0.153 0.151
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A12. Dropping equity 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Funding Goal, Pre-money Valuation, and Equity Offered
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.287** 0.197** 0.153 0.071 0.888 0.722
(2.23) (2.06) (1.25) (0.76) (1.20) (1.26)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.420** 0.309** 0.480*** 0.399*** -1.098 -0.935
(2.55) (2.64) (3.38) (3.52) (-1.24) (-1.34)
FEMALES (%) -0.353** -0.164* -0.442
(-2.57) (-1.77) (-0.58)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.267* -0.153 -0.153
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-0.18)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.293** -0.060 -1.037
(-2.14) (-0.67) (-1.50)
N 767 767 767 767 767 767
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.344 0.441 0.441 0.107 0.108
Panel B: Determinants of Campaign Success and Funding Received
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.270 0.150 0.328* 0.186 0.439* 0.329* -0.051 -0.059
(1.61) (1.18) (1.95) (1.46) (1.92) (1.82) (-0.96) (-1.41)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.062 -0.034 0.134 0.016 0.644* 0.486** 0.030 0.001
(0.25) (-0.20) (0.56) (0.09) (1.86) (2.18) (0.40) (0.02)
FEMALES (%) -0.184 -0.243 -0.686** -0.086
(-1.09) (-1.44) (-3.15) (-1.29)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.131 -0.167 -0.628** -0.184**
(-0.70) (-0.90) (-2.49) (-2.62)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.181 -0.333 0.096*
(-0.80) (-1.18) (-1.22) (1.78)
FUNDING GOAL No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767 333 333 333 333
Adjusted R squared 0.181 0.179 0.191 0.189 0.316 0.314 0.952 0.953
Panel C: Investment Flows and Campaign Stopping Decisions
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.488 0.245 0.405 0.188 0.041 0.024
(1.45) (0.92) (1.20) (0.72) (1.36) (0.89)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.471 0.116 0.357 0.031 -0.015 -0.025
(0.94) (0.32) (0.73) (0.09) (-0.47) (-0.97)
FEMALES (%) -0.812** -0.720** -0.058*
(-2.61) (-2.30) (-1.78)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.818** -0.742** -0.052
(-2.41) (-2.14) (-1.38)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.201 -0.130 -0.028
(-0.69) (-0.45) (-0.85)
FUNDING GOAL No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35035 35035 35035 35035 7814 7814
N groups 719 719 719 719 321 321
Between R-squared 0.152 0.151
Investment Flow Stop (2nd stage)
Total Effect Direct Effect Direct Effect
Funding Goal Pre-money Valuation Equity Offered
Campaign Success Funding Received
Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect
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Table A13. Weather affecting both the funding flow and the stopping decision 
 
 
Table A14. Simultaneously estimated determinants of funding goal and equity offered 
 
 
  
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
INSTRUMENTED FLOW -0.037*** -0.037***
(-3.41) (-3.42)
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.112 -0.154 0.055 0.038
(0.3) (-0.50) (1.43) (1.10)
EDUCATION (%, D) -0.007 -0.372 -0.021 -0.029
(-0.02) (-1.24) (-0.52) (-0.89)
FEMALES (%) -0.563 -0.076*
(-1.57) (-1.91)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -1.036** -0.068
(-2.74) (-1.48)
FEMALES MIXED (D) 0.331 -0.038
(0.93) (-0.93)
MOMENTUM VARIABLES Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7814 7814 7814 7814
N successful 321 321 321 321
Between R-squared 0.172 0.172
0.629 0.634
0.000 0.000Sanderson-Windmeijer F informativeness test
Flow (1st stage) Stop (2nd stage)
direct effect direct effect
Sargan-Hansen overidentification test
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.287** 0.197** 0.888 0.722
(2.28) (2.10) (1.23) (1.29)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.420** 0.309** -1.098 -0.935
(2.60) (2.70) (-1.26) (-1.37)
FEMALES (%) -0.353** -0.442
(-2.62) (-0.59)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.267* -0.153
(-1.76) (-0.18)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.293** -1.037
(-2.19) (-1.53)
N 767 767 767 767
Funding Goal Equity Offered
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Appendix B: Empirical Analysis that Corrects for Selection Bias  
Here we consider the econometric issue that outcomes like funding raised and the entrepreneur’s stopping 
decision are only observed for successful campaigns. If the campaign is unsuccessful because it is unable 
to reach the campaign goal within 60 days, founders get no money. If the probability of success is a function 
of founder characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, the sample of successful campaigns is not representative of the founder 
population. Then regressing amounts raised on team characteristics in a censored sample of successful 
campaigns might produce biased estimates due to this selection bias.  
We use the two-step Heckman (1979) model to correct for potential selection bias, which relies on the 
notion that this is a form of omitted variable bias.1 We formulate a model for the probability of having a 
successful campaign, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, which is a function of both founder characteristics as well as other selection 
variables, i.e., a function of 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖. This first stage captures the probability of being in the sample of 
successful campaigns. In the second stage, we estimate our variables of interest, the funding raised (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) and 
the entrepreneur’s stopping decision (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) in the sample of successful campaigns and include an 
additional term that represents the probability of being in the sample given founder characteristics and other 
selection variables. This term, called the Inverse Mills Ratio, thus corrects for selection bias. 
The specification for the funding amount with the Heckman correction is: 
�
Pr(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = Φ(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 , ∀𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + (𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾�) + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖   
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 are individual campaigns and where 𝜆𝜆 is the Inverse Mills Ratio evaluated at 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾�, and 
𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 is it's coefficient. Here 𝜌𝜌 is the correlation between unobserved determinants of campaign success and 
unobserved determinants of variable of interest 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝜌𝜌 is the standard deviation of the unoberserved 
determinants of variable of interest 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 . The coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 indicates whether 
selection bias is present when tested against the null of zero. The coefficients 𝛽𝛽 on explanatory variables of 
interest 𝑋𝑋 are unbiased, such as those in the model 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜓𝜓, which is unconditional on success, and 
this is the relationship of interest. 
The identification of unbiased coefficients under this Heckman procedure relies on the non-linearity in the 
Inverse Mills Ratio and from having at least one selection variable included in the first stage but not the 
second. This selection variable should predict the probability of success with a coefficient that is statistically 
significantly different from zero but should not directly explain 𝐹𝐹 except through the probability of success. 
We use cross-sectional momentum variables 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖, the proxies for investor demand during the first week of 
the campaign, which include the number (#) and strengths ($) of competing campaigns, tax credit deadlines, 
Google trends, rain, and temperatures, during the first week of the campaign. This is in line with the 
evidence that early momentum can have an important effect on campaign success (see for example Vulkan 
et al (2015), Mollick (2014) and Åstebro et al. (2017)). The argument is that competition on the SEEDRS 
platform, weather, tax breaks inducement, and popularity for this alternative asset class, all during campaign 
start (the first week of the campaign), do not influence eventual funding amount raised except through the 
probability of success. 
Thus, we estimate a Heckman two-stage model, to account for the effect that funding amounts are only 
observable conditional on campaign success. The selection stage regression is reported in Table B1. The 
                                                     
1 See Heckman, James, 1979, “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica, 47(1), 153-161. 
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second regression of the two-step Heckman selection model for total funding raised is reported in Table 
B2, where the estimated coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌�  Inverse Mills Ratio term is not statistically different from zero. 
Table B1. Determinants of campaign success, for the Heckman correction 
This table reports a Probit regressions for campaign success (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) in the cross-sectional sample of all 
campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), and control variables 
(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). The direct effect regressions further include fundraising campaigns (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖) and cross-sectional 
momentum variables (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖). All variables are described in Table 1. T-statistics are in parentheses and standard 
errors are clustered at the company-level to take into account repeat campaigns. 
 
  
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.297* 0.168 0.353** 0.201
(1.78) (1.31) (2.11) (1.57)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.041 -0.027 0.142 0.046
(0.16) (-0.16) (0.57) (0.27)
FEMALES (%) -0.156 -0.225
(-0.93) (-1.35)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.104 -0.151
(-0.56) (-0.83)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.121 -0.183
(-0.79) (-1.18)
FUNDING GOAL -0.211*** -0.206***
(-3.44) (-3.36)
EQUITY OFFERED 0.007 0.007
(0.84) (0.81)
TEAM SIZE 0.031 0.034 0.061 0.065
(0.47) (0.45) (0.91) (0.86)
PRIOR SEEDRS 1.099*** 1.113*** 0.973*** 0.994***
(8.92) (8.95) (7.32) (7.38)
SEIS 0.369* 0.354* 0.242 0.230
(1.78) (1.71) (1.17) (1.11)
EIS 0.663*** 0.650** 0.745*** 0.725***
(3.34) (3.28) (3.90) (3.81)
continued on next page…
Campaign Success
Total effect Direct effect
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Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
continued from previous page…
COMPETITION (#) 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.05) (0.07) (-0.02) (-0.02)
COMPETITION (£) -0.160** -0.156** -0.176** -0.171**
(-2.12) (-2.07) (-2.30) (-2.25)
DEADLINE*SEIS 0.217 0.210 0.267 0.253
(0.72) (0.69) (0.89) (0.83)
DEADLINE*EIS -0.468 -0.452 -0.393 -0.370
(-1.58) (-1.51) (-1.29) (-1.20)
GOOGLE TRENDS 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.66) (2.69) (2.73) (2.78)
RAIN -0.096** -0.096** -0.092** -0.092**
(-2.16) (-2.14) (-2.02) (-2.02)
TEMP: <5C -0.070 -0.059 -0.096 -0.083
(-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.37) (-0.32)
TEMP: 5C to 10C 0.148 0.152 0.178 0.186
(0.88) (0.91) (1.05) (1.10)
TEMP: 15C to 20C 0.194 0.207 0.207 0.222
(1.09) (1.16) (1.17) (1.25)
TEMP: >20C 0.448 0.458 0.409 0.425
(1.44) (1.46) (1.31) (1.36)
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 767 767 767 767
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.198 0.211 0.209
F test 0.042 0.043 0.037 0.037
Campaign Success
Total effect Direct effect
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Table B2. Determinants of funding amount, with a Heckman correction 
This table reports OLS regressions the funding amount (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) in the cross-sectional sample of all successful 
campaigns. The explanatory variables include all founder team characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) and control variables 
(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). The direct effect regressions further include fundraising campaigns (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖). All variables are described 
in Table 1. T-statistics are in parentheses based on two-step Heckman (1979) standard errors. The 
coefficient on the IMR lambda variable captures the selection bias correction based on the selection 
equation reported in Table B1. 
 
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
EXPERIENCE (%, D) 0.390* 0.299* -0.081 -0.076*
(1.86) (1.89) (-1.41) (-1.79)
EDUCATION (%, D) 0.638** 0.492** 0.004 -0.011
(2.32) (2.47) (0.05) (-0.20)
FEMALES (%) -0.653** -0.061
(-2.93) (-0.99)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.606** -0.165**
(-2.49) (-2.54)
FEMALES MIXED (D) -0.303 0.110*
(-1.43) (1.93)
FUNDING GOAL 1.047*** 1.049***
(50.80) (52.20)
EQUITY OFFERED -0.006** -0.006**
(-2.36) (-2.28)
TEAM SIZE 0.113 0.092 -0.034 -0.062**
(1.42) (1.03) (-1.55) (-2.61)
PRIOR SEEDRS -1.182*** -1.183*** -0.064 -0.061
(-3.72) (-3.66) (-0.84) (-0.80)
SEIS -0.617* -0.621** 0.058 0.048
(-1.95) (-1.97) (0.72) (0.61)
EIS 0.230 0.212 0.015 0.022
(0.66) (0.61) (0.16) (0.24)
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
IMR lambda -0.317 -0.342 -0.157 -0.151
(-0.64) (-0.68) (-1.24) (-1.20)
N total 767 767 767 767
N successful 333 333 333 333
F test 0.053 0.053 0.047 0.047
Funding Received
Total effect Direct effect
with Heckman correction
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For the optimal stopping decision, we estimate a model with both selection effects and a system of 
endogenous equations by following the procedure suggested in Woodridge (2002, p.568). He suggests to 
first correct for selection bias by including the Inverse Mills ratio in both the endogenous investment 
equation for 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (where we use the time-varying momentum variables 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 as instruments for 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) and 
in the stopping equation for 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Thus, it is a system of three equations, as below. 
�
Pr(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = Φ(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 , ∀𝑖𝑖
�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1� = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + (𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾�) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , for 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 8
�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1� = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣� 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + (𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾�) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , for 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 8  
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 are individual campaigns and 𝑡𝑡 = 8, … ,𝑇𝑇 are days from hitting the target. 
The null hypothesis of no selection effects can be tested using standard t-tests for the coefficient of the 
Inverse Mills ratio. Under the null of no selection, the standard errors are correct (Woodridge 2002, 
p.568).  
Table B3 reports the second equation for lagged daily investment flows 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and the third equation for 
the stopping dummy (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1), with this selection bias correction. We find that the estimated coefficient 
𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌�  Inverse Mills Ratio term 𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾�) is not statistically different from zero and therefore selection effects 
are not a concern in this particular system of equations. 
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Table B3. Determinants of campaign stopping decisions, with a Heckman correction 
This table reports the two-stage GLS (random effects with IV) panel regression for the stopping dummy 
(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) with instrumented lagged daily investment flows and with a selection bias correction. The 
sample includes only successful campaigns, starts after the cooling off period, and includes panel 
variables (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). As before, the (2nd stage) stopping regression include the lagged daily investment flows 
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), which are instrumented with a (1st stage) regression that includes all variables from the 2nd stage, 
as well as the daily momentum variables (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). All variables are described in Table 1. T-statistics are in 
parentheses and are clustered at company level to take into account repeat campaigns. The coefficient on 
the IMR lambda variable captures the selection bias correction based on the selection equation reported in 
Table B1. 
 
Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy
model model model model
INSTRUMENTED FLOW -0.021** -0.021**
(-2.48) (-2.48)
EXPERIENCE (%, D) -0.074 -0.271 0.049 0.032
(-0.18) (-0.87) (1.48) (1.13)
EDUCATION (%, D) -0.025 -0.328 -0.010 -0.017
(-0.06) (-1.05) (-0.30) (-0.69)
FEMALES (%) -0.363 -0.057*
(-0.95) (-1.70)
FEMALES ONLY (D) -0.698* -0.043
(-1.73) (-1.19)
FEMALES MIXED (D) 0.244 -0.034
(0.63) (-0.97)
FUNDING GOAL 0.796*** 0.814*** -0.016 -0.014
(5.81) (5.94) (-0.98) (-0.84)
EQUITY OFFERED 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001
(0.40) (0.39) (0.81) (0.76)
COOLING OFF 1.837** 1.751** 0.143** 0.145**
(2.52) (2.44) (2.12) (2.12)
TEAM SIZE -0.220 -0.308** -0.010 -0.009
(-1.57) (-2.03) (-0.81) (-0.67)
PRIOR SEEDRS -0.732 -0.676 0.032 0.027
(-1.34) (-1.20) (0.60) (0.49)
SEIS 0.580 0.506 0.031 0.027
(1.20) (1.04) (0.62) (0.53)
EIS -0.099 -0.065 -0.031 -0.038
(-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.54) (-0.67)
HOLIDAYS -0.161 -0.162 0.143** -0.025**
(-0.94) (-0.94) (2.12) (-3.22)
MOMENTUM VARIABLES Yes Yes
TIME TREND Yes Yes Yes Yes
SECTOR Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
QUARTER Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
WEEK-DAY Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
IMR lambda -1.082 -0.978 0.033 0.020
(-1.16) (-1.03) (0.38) (0.23)
N 7814 7814 7814 7814
N successful 321 321 321 321
Stop (2nd stage)
direct effect
Flow (1st stage)
direct effect
Appendix C: Theory
C.1 The model
Given the project and the characteristics of the entrepreneurs behind it, there is an expected 
amount of money  available. The entrepreneurs have to declare a goal  for the campaign 
and they have T = 60 days to achieve the goal. During the campaign, the entrepreneurs 
receive  which is a Gaussian random variable1 centered at  with a standard deviation : 
If  is below , it fails. If  is above , the entrepreneurs can raise more money.
Clearly, the entrepreneurs have an incentive to announce a goal  that is low and keep 
going after the goal is reached. However, the market is reasonable, meaning there is a limit 
on how much overfunding can be raised, and therefore too low campaign goals will not be 
able to reach the actual amount needed. We model this as follows: given your target , you 
can only raise min (; ), that is, the capital the entrepreneurs get is bounded from above 
by an amount  that is related to what they initially asked for,  being a constant larger 
than 1.
The entrepreneurs maximize their expected realized funding
EP [min (; ) I] (1)
where the indicator function I worth 1 if the campaign is a success and 0 otherwise.
The optimal goal is denoted :
C.2 Results
We are now able to show the following results: the entrepreneurs set the campaign goal to
maximize their expected realized funding EP [min (; ) I] where the indicator function
I worth 1 if the campaign is a success and 0 otherwise. The optimal goal  satises
 = arg max>0EP [min (; ) I] :
Lemma 1 The expected realized funding is
EP [min (; ) I] (2)
=
8>><>>:


 ( z) + 

' (z)  ' (z + (  1) ( 1 + z))
+ (z + (  1) ( 1 + z))  ( z   (  1) ( 1 + z))

if  > 0
min (; (1 + (  1)) ) I if  = 0
1If Yt denotes the invested capital at day t, then the total available capital is  =
P
t=1 Yt where  is
the time at which the campaign ceases. In the case where fYtg1t=1 is a sequence of independent identically
distributed random variables (not necessarily Gaussian), than the central limit theorem implies that  is
approximately Gaussian for  su¢ ciently large. Since a campaign usually last at least 60 days, it is reasonable
to assume a Gaussian distribution for :
1
where z = (   ) =,  = =;  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal random variable, ' is its correspondent density function2.
In the case where  = 0, min (; ) I is maximized at  = : In the case where  > 0,
the maximization of Equation (2) leads to an optimal goal  (,; ) that is a function of
the parameters. The optimization is performed numerically.
Proof. If  > 0 and  = 

, then
EP [min (; ) I] = EP

+ min

  

;
   


I 

  


= EP

+ min

Z;
(  1)+ z


IZz

where z =
   

= EP
 
 1 +min
 
Z; z + (  1)   1 + z IZz
= 
 
 1EP [IZz] + EP

Z
 
IZz   IZz+( 1)( 1+z)

+
 
z + (  1)   1 + zEP IZz+( 1)( 1+z)
= 
 
 1 ( z) + ' (z)  '  z + (  1)   1 + z

 
z + (  1)   1 + z   z   (  1)   1 + z
where the last equality comes from Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2 For a standard normal random variable Z, its truncated moment satises
EP

ZkIZ>a

= ak 1' (a) + (k   1) EP Zk 2IZ>a :
In particular,
EP [ZIZ>a] = ' (a) , and EP

Z2IZ>a

= a' (a) +  ( a)
where  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
If the campaign is successful, the following equation described the expected realized
funding exceeding the campaign goal:
EP [min (; ) I]  : (3)
2The density function is ' (z) = 1p
2
exp

  z22

and the cumulative function satises  (y) =R y
 1 ' (z) dz. Note that
@'
@z (z) =  z' (z) :
2
C.3 Comparative Statics
We now provide some numerical detailed examples which illustrate important features of our
model. Indeed, Figure 1 shows the expected realized funding EP [min (; ) I], seen as 
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Figure 1. Expected realized funding
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We observed that within the interval  2 [7:5%; 25%],
(1) the optimal campaign goal  is a function of  since all the expected realized funding
doesnt reach their maximum at the same value of ;
(2) the optimal expected funding  is smaller than the expected funding  available to the
entrepreneur;
(3) the optimal campaign goal  is a decreasing function of ; meaning the better informed
entrepreneurs ask for more.
(4) Seen as a function of , the optimal campaign goal  decreases as  increases. One
interpretation is that more risk averse entrepreneurs (with respect to likelihood of campaign
failing) will set a lower goal.
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Figure 2. Expected over funding funding
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Figure 2 presents the expected over funding EP [min (; ) I]    (red curves) for
 2 f7:5%; 10%; 12:5%; 15%; 17:5%; 20%; 22:5%; 25%g, the dashed dark red (light red) line
corresponds to the lowest (highest) . The overfunding at the optimal campaign goal 
correspond to the level of the red curve at the point where the corresponding blue/black
curve is maximized. We conclude from this gure that
(1) the expected overfunding for campaign goal is positive in the neighborhood of the opti-
mum;
(2) the expected overfunding is more important when the multiplier  that determines the
upper bound is larger;
(3) for the two cases under study, the expected overfunding at the optimal campaign goal 
decreases with the standard deviation  and the di¤erences is less important when the upper
bound is looser (larger ). So better informed entrepreneurs will take less overfunding.
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